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ABSTRACT 
Self-regulation is a vital function to humanity, and is an important factor in the dominant 
paradigm of consumer research, whereby consumer decisions are characterised by the battle 
between long- and short-term interests. The current research examined the relative effectiveness 
of two self-regulatory strategies: stopping an already-commenced consumption episode, or to 
not commence one at all. Traditional economic theories, including the principle of diminishing 
marginal utility, would predict that not starting is harder to accomplish; whereas a proposal by 
Thaler (1983) suggests that not starting is in fact the optimal strategy. Two studies were 
conducted whereby participants were asked to either perform a less-favoured task and resist 
from starting a more-favoured one (Not Start), or to cease performing a more-favoured task to 
complete the less-favoured task (Stop). Study 1 found that Stop was more difficult than Not Start, 
which tentatively supported Thaler’s argument; however there was an explanation which could 
not be ruled out, namely the psychological distance of the anticipated second task. Study 2 
addressed this issue by manipulating that factor by incorporating it into the experimental 
design. It was found that Not Start became as depleting as Stop when psychological distance of 
the second task was reduced. This research contributed to the literature by establishing a 
boundary condition upon the strength model of self-regulatory resource depletion, and adds to 
the discussion on the descriptive validity of the principle of diminishing marginal utility. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
One of the most important features of humanity is the ability to control and 
manage their behaviour in order to selectively avoid the influence of immediate, 
external constraints (Bandura, 1977; Baumeister & Heatherton, 1996). Without this 
ability, humans would be slaves to their immediate urges, behaving without regarding 
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their own (or others’) long-term wellbeing. This ability, known as self-control or self-
regulation1, allows humans to alter a variety of responses (Baumeister, 2002), including 
thoughts (e.g., by suppressing particular thoughts or forcing oneself to concentrate), 
emotions (getting into or out of a particular emotion or mood), regulating impulses (e.g., 
by resisting temptation), and persistence. 
Self-control has long been found to have implications for a wide range of 
economic and social behavioural patterns, such as aggression (e.g., DeWall, Baumeister, 
Stillman, & Gailliot, 2007; Twenge, Baumeister, Tice, & Stucke, 2001), diet (e.g., Kahan, 
Polivy, & Herman, 2003; Polivy, Herman, Hackett, & Kuleshnyk, 1986), and addiction 
(e.g., Kirschenbaum, 1987; Muraven, Collins, & Nienhaus, 2002; Muraven, Collins, 
Shiffman, & Paty, 2005). Indeed, children’s ability to engage in self-control has been 
demonstrated to be related to academic and social competence later in life, such as 
greater attentiveness, improved stress-coping abilities, social confidence (Funder & 
Block, 1989), as well as better scholastic performances (Mischel, Shoda, & Rodriguez, 
1989; Shoda, Mischel, & Peake, 1990). These studies clearly demonstrated that self-
control is a ubiquitous phenomenon, with important implications for many facets of 
                                                 
1 The terms “self-control” and “self-regulation” are used interchangeably throughout this document (see 
Baumeister, 2002; Vohs & Schmeichel, 2003). 
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daily human functioning and development (Muraven, Tice, & Baumeister, 1998; Thaler 
& Shefrin, 1981). 
It is perhaps paradoxical that even though self-control is important to human 
well-being, people continue to fail at it consistently (Baumeister & Heatherton, 1996). 
Many of us have attempted a wide range of self-control activities like diet programs, 
exercise regimes, or productive work routines; yet most of us have also heard tales of 
losing the battle to avoid the tasty chocolate treat, skipping gym, or passive TV-
watching instead of completing work. It does not appear that this self-regulatory failure 
is due to lack of practice or experience: most people begin to learn self-control 
behaviour as soon as they start to learn the norms and rules of the world (Thaler & 
Shefrin, 1981). This learning is ongoing throughout life, both via first-hand experiences 
and by observing the experiences of others. In the majority of instances, people do 
achieve self-control quite successfully. This raises the question: given the importance of 
self-control, the vast number of examples of success, and the many experiences of 
successful self-regulation, why do self-regulation failures still occur? 
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2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Past research on self-control behaviour 
The importance of self-control - and paradoxically, the ubiquitousness of self-
control failures - has stimulated extensive attention across a number of research 
disciplines, including psychology (e.g., Ainslie, 1975; Baumeister & Heatherton, 1996; 
Mischel & Ebbesen, 1970), behavioural economics (e.g., Strotz, 1955; Thaler & Shefrin, 
1981), and political science (e.g., Elster, 1977; Schelling, 1978). Self-control problems are 
thought to originate from humans having “time-inconsistent preferences” (Ainslie, 1975; 
Frederick, Loewenstein, & O'Donoghue, 2002; Strotz, 1955) with a “present bias” 
favouring immediate utility over delayed utility (O'Donoghue & Rabin, 1999)2. The 
implication of this present-biased time-inconsistent preference is that when considering 
a trade-off between two future events separated in time, a person’s preference may 
ordinarily reflect their long-term best interests; but as the events get closer in time, the 
                                                 
2  The phenomenon of favouring immediate gratification has also been termed “time preference” 
(Frederick et al., 2002). For consistency, only the term “present bias” will be used to describe this 
phenomenon. 
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person would tend to temporarily assign more relative weight to the more-imminent 
event, which may be smaller or poorer than the alternative (Ainslie, 1975; O'Donoghue 
& Rabin, 1999). Self-control problems arise when this change in preference results in a 
decision that may compromise the person’s long-run wellbeing, even if the decision 
brings about some immediate gratification (O'Donoghue & Rabin, 2000). For example, 
given a choice between earning $100 on October 1 or earning $200 on October 15, if 
asked in June most people would prefer the $200 alternative; however when asked on 
September 31, most people would prefer the $100 in one day rather than the $200 in 16 
days, resulting in a suboptimal outcome (adopted from O'Donoghue & Rabin, 1999). 
This change in preference across time can occur without the individual gaining any 
additional information about the choices (Strotz, 1955). 
Self-control is particularly important for contemporary consumer behaviour 
research. In the past, the dominant marketing research paradigm had been the rational 
choice model, where consumers were assumed to be dispassionate information 
processors, rationally weighing benefits and costs and effortlessly implementing their 
decisions (Bettman, 1979). This view of consumer behaviour, however, had long been 
identified as inadequate, because a more complete understanding of consumer 
behaviour requires consideration of both long-term rational concerns and short-term 
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emotional factors (Hoch & Loewenstein, 1991). Furthermore, until relatively recently, 
economists have assumed that people’s preferences are consistent over time, thus 
neglecting the possibility of self-control problems and the implications of time-
inconsistent preferences (O'Donoghue & Rabin, 2000). 
About two decades ago, a body of literature emerged examining how consumer 
decision-making is influenced by transient changes in preferences across time. Hoch 
and Loewenstein (1991) framed consumer decision-making as a struggle between long-
term cognitive and short-term affective factors. They suggested that when affective 
factors are given more weight, consumers are likely to become impatient and make 
immediate purchases that they may regret later (i.e., “impulsive shopping”, Rook (1987) 
and Rook and Fisher (1995)). Consumers are, however, not entirely helpless against 
temporary changes in their preferences; they can use self-control to ensure that their 
actions are consistent with their long-term interests (Hoch & Loewenstein, 1991; 
Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999). More specifically, the greater the resources available to enact 
self-regulation, the more likely consumers are to resist the influences of transient 
emotional factors. 
Further evidence supporting the hypothesis has been revealed in various aspects 
of consumer behaviour. For instance, engagement in active emotional regulation 
13 
 
 
 
increases the likelihood of risky choices (Bruyneel, Dewitte, Franses, & Dekimpe, 2009). 
Restrained eaters who were made to complete a cognitively draining task were 
subsequently found to be more susceptible to increased food intake than fellow 
restrained eaters who did no such draining tasks (Kahan et al., 2003). Also, consumers 
who have engaged in some prior self-regulatory behaviour were found to have stronger 
urges and spend more money in subsequent (unanticipated) buying situations than 
participants who have not self-regulated (Vohs & Faber, 2007). Clearly, studies in self-
control have contributed to understanding of consumers’ behaviour. 
2.1.1 Thaler’s Mirage and two self-regulatory strategies: Stop vs. Not Start. 
One of the most basic self-control dilemmas faced by consumers is the question 
of whether to engage in a consumption episode. There may be times when a consumer 
may choose to decline a consumption episode – even at the cost of forgoing the 
enjoyment associated with the episode – in order to avoid the adverse consequences of 
over-consuming. This scenario is illustrated by Thaler (1983) in his discussions of a 
“Mirage” in public policy decisions: 
“A group of economists was sitting around having cocktails, awaiting the arrival of 
dinner. A large bowl of cashews was placed on the cocktail table, and within 90 seconds one half 
of the cashews were gone. A simple linear extrapolation would have predicted the total demise of 
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the cashews and our appetites in another 90 seconds. Leaping into action, I grabbed the bowl and 
(while stealing a few more nuts on the way) hid it in the kitchen. Everyone seemed relieved, yet 
puzzled. How could removing the bowl, and thus removing a choice, have made us better off?” 
Thaler (1983) illustrated the Mirage with the following decision-tree: 
  
Figure 2-1: A decision-tree illustrating the options available to the hungry economists in Thaler’s (1983) 
illustration of the “Mirage”. 
Here, the dinner guests have two incompatible motivations: their immediate 
interests (to eat cashews) and their overall preference (to maintain appetite). 
Presumably, the dinner guests would like to enjoy some cashews (+1), but would not 
like to consume so much that they completely lose their appetite (-1). Thaler (1983) 
argued that, ordinarily, a rational consumer would choose Option 1, which represents 
the Stop strategy. This is because the rational consumer believes that there is some non-
zero probability of reaching the best outcome of eating just a few cashews (Outcome A, 
the relative value of the outcome is denoted by +1). This outcome is presumably more 
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enjoyable than choosing Not Start, or eating no cashews at all (Outcome C, 0), which 
would have been the necessary consequence of choosing Option 2 (remove bowl). In 
addition, it is a fundamental economic tenet that having more choices could only make 
one better off; conversely the reduction of choices (i.e., imposition of constraints) would 
make one worse off (Thaler, 1980). Option 2 (remove bowl) can lead to only one 
outcome (C: no cashews;) whereas Option 1 (keep the bowl), ostensibly, allows 
consumers to use discretion to eat just a small number of cashew, enough to satisfy their 
immediate cravings yet retain their appetite. The superior outcome offered by Option 1, 
and the ostensible availability of discretion, seem to make Stop (Option 1) the superior 
strategy compared to Not Start (Option 2). 
Thaler (1983), however, argued that the discretion offered to consumers in 
Option 1 is sometimes not feasible at all. Even though Option 1 ostensibly offers a 
pathway to the best outcome (A), that pathway is merely a mirage. The dinner guests 
would probably fail to stop eating at the appropriate moment and end up overeating, 
thus arriving at the least desirable outcome (Outcome B). Thaler argued that declining 
consumption and removing the bowl (Option 2) is, in fact, the most rational option, 
because the only outcome available from this option – no more cashews (Outcome C) – 
is better than the only realistic, non-mirage outcome that results from Option 1. 
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Thaler’s (1983) story illustrated the two strategies that form the subject of the 
current investigation: Stop and Not Start. Both strategies can be examples of 
“precommitment”, which are measures taken by consumers to limit their future 
behaviour in order to ensure that they will act in a way that is consistent with their 
long-term preferences (Strotz, 1955). Not Start is definitely a form of precommitment, 
while Stop may include plans to assist in the act of stopping after an appropriate level of 
consumption. Both strategies require self-control, because in both cases the consumer 
has to override a dominant response (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, & Tice, 1998): 
in Stop, the consumer has to overcome the urge to continue consumption and cease it at 
the appropriate time; in Not Start, the consumer has to overcome the urge to start 
consuming at all. The relative efficacy of the two strategies is yet to be examined in 
detail in existing literature concerning self-control. 
Most of the self-regulation literature has examined the implications of activities 
that involve the Not Start strategy, but relatively few have dealt with Stop. A growing 
body of literature on the “strength model” of self-regulatory resources (e.g., Baumeister 
et al., 1998; Muraven et al., 1998) (to be discussed further in section 2.2 below) also 
focussed primarily on self-regulatory strategies that require impulse control (i.e., resist 
from doing something) (Carver & Scheier, 1996). The Not Start strategy is common in 
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daily life, where people often establish rules to prevent engaging in a tempting activity 
lest they cannot stop. Thaler and Shefrin (1981) outlined a number of examples: 
“Christmas Club” accounts (which pay no interests and prescribe punitive fees for 
withdrawals before the Christmas season, thus appearing to be a very poor savings 
option compared to a regular saving account;) ingestion of the drug Antabuse which 
makes one physically sick if they consume alcohol; or “fat farms” where participants 
pay to receive a guarantee that they would be under-fed by the operators. In all of these 
examples, people paid a premium to ensure that they stay with their pre-planned 
course of action. Those who adopted the Not Start strategy would have considered it 
sufficiently meritorious even though the strategy would limit their utility. 
In contrast, Stop strategies have generally been discussed on a hypothetical or 
speculative level. For instance, Baumeister and Heatherton (1996) argued that the longer 
an activity goes on, the harder it is to self-regulate against that activity, and thus it is 
simpler to avoid a temptation than to overcome it. Ainslie (1975) briefly discussed a 
type of self-control called “rationing reward” (p. 487), where a consumer must choose 
between consuming a reward quickly and intensely, and consuming one slowly and 
gradually. Ainslie suggested that consumers would “probably” gain more utility from 
the latter strategy, although he did not elaborate on his reasons. It seems that this 
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“rationing reward” strategy would have been useful in Thaler’s (1983) dinner party 
example, in that had the dinner guests consumed the cashews slowly they might have 
gained some enjoyment without overeating; however once again there is no 
experimental evidence to show the efficacy of this strategy, or to demonstrate its 
relative effectiveness against Not Start. 
There had been some studies attempting to contrast Not Start against other self-
regulatory strategies; but none had specifically examined the efficacy of Stop in 
comparison to Not Start. For example, Kirschenbaum (1987) identified two major types 
of self-controlling responses: resisting temptation (i.e., foregoing short-term positive 
consequences to avoid negative consequences in the long-run, e.g., dieter resisting 
dessert to avoid weight gain) and tolerating “noxious stimulation” (i.e., incurring short-
term negative consequences to attain long term positive consequences, e.g., student 
memorising boring formulae to achieve high grade). Resisting temptation is similar to 
the Not Start strategy examined in this study; however the possibility of self-regulating 
by ceasing an existing consumption episode was not considered in Kirschenbaum’s 
study. Other authors (e.g., O'Donoghue & Rabin, 1999, 2000) have considered the effect 
of a similar pair of self-regulatory strategies – delaying pleasure versus bringing 
forward pain – which again did not address the question posed by Thaler (1983).  
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Despite Thaler’s (1983) belief and the many precommitment devices using the 
Not Start strategy, Stop is not always unattainable and is sometimes a viable strategy. It 
is possible for consumers to set limits on their consumption, begin to consume, and stop 
consuming at the pre-determined limit. It has also been observed that even the most 
ardent addict can occasionally control their consumption levels (Vohs & Faber, 2007). 
Indeed, if humans were completely unable to stop consuming, the question of whether 
Stop is more difficult than Not Start would be a moot point because no one would ever 
consider Stop a possibility. One of the primary objectives of this research is to directly 
test the relative efficacies of the Stop and Not Start strategies. As will be discussed below, 
it is not immediately clear that Stop is necessarily more difficult to achieve than Not 
Start, particularly if a number of economics principles are considered. 
2.1.2 Thaler’s Mirage and the principle of Diminishing Marginal Utility. 
Thaler (1983) argued that sometimes it is better for consumers to forego 
consumption rather than keeping the option to consume open, in order to avoid 
potentially negative outcomes (e.g., from overconsumption). If Thaler is correct, then 
one should expect Not Start to be easier to achieve than Stop, because if Stop were easier 
to accomplish, there should be no need for consumers to guard against continuing 
consumption. However this belief is contrary to a number of established economic 
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principles. For instance, as stated earlier, the Stop strategy allows consumers to use 
discretion on whether to continue consuming, whereas Not Start precludes this 
discretion. Thaler (1980) suggested that having more choices available to consumers is 
always beneficial to consumers, according to fundamental economic tenets. 
Additionally, Thaler’s (1983) prediction is one of a number of relatively recent results 
that are inconsistent with the principle of Diminishing Marginal Utility (“DMU”). DMU 
states that as individuals engage in an episode of consumption, each additional unit of 
consumption would provide less utility than the previously unit of consumption. DMU 
has long been a central component of economic theories such as expected utility theory, 
decisions under uncertainty, and analysis of demand (e.g., Jevons, 1879; Marshall, 1920; 
Schlee, 1992). Despite its widespread application, DMU’s predictive validity in real-
world scenarios had come under scrutiny (e.g. Rabin, 2000a; Rabin, 2000b; Rabin & 
Thaler, 2001). These authors’ main criticism was that DMU predicts an implausibly high 
level of risk aversion. It is the concavity of the utility function which predicts that a 
person who refuses a 50-50 bet of losing $10 or gaining $11, they would also refuse a 50-
50 bet involving a $100 loss, even with the potential gain of several million dollars 
(Rabin & Thaler, 2001). Thaler’s (1983) Mirage can be seen as another contention which 
questioned this principle, despite not directly stated so by the author. 
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DMU has not yet been directly invoked to explain self-regulation, let alone to 
explain the relative merits of the two self-regulatory strategies under investigation here. 
However if DMU were to be used to predict the current research question, it would 
have predicted that Stop is preferable to Not Start. The prediction follows DMU’s 
essential point that, as a consumption episode goes on, each unit of consumption 
provides less utility for the consumer than the previous unit of consumption. If an 
object’s utility is positively correlated to the degree of difficulty required to self-
regulatory against the object (Hoch & Loewenstein, 1991, Figure 3), the gradual 
decrease in utility in the course of consumption means it should be increasingly easy for 
a consumer to stop consuming. It also follows that if every unit of consumption has less 
utility than the previous one, then the consumer would derive the maximum utility 
from the very first unit of consumption. DMU would have predicted that if the 
consumer chooses to decline all consumption (i.e., Not Start), they would be self-
regulating from a position where the object of regulation has the greatest utility, thus 
making Not Start very difficult to achieve. The view that Not Start is easier to achieve 
than Stop (Ainslie, 1975; Strotz, 1955; Thaler, 1983) is therefore inconsistent with the 
prediction that would have been advanced by DMU. 
22 
 
 
 
In short, Thaler’s Mirage (1983) illustrates an instance where the optimal 
outcome (i.e., to not start consuming) seems to be at odds with what would have been 
predicted by DMU (i.e., to consume and then stop). DMU is a robust theory that is 
pivotal to a number of economic theories; however Thaler’s Mirage describes a very 
common real-world phenomenon whereby consumers would attempt to limit their 
consumption (Thaler & Shefrin, 1981). Also as stated earlier, despite what is asserted in 
Thaler’s Mirage, Stop is sometimes possible to achieve; and there are circumstances 
under which Stop does provide better outcome than Not Start. The relative efficacy of 
the two self-regulatory strategies, and the boundary conditions under which each 
strategy is superior, form the crux of this investigation. 
2.2 Strength model of self-regulation and depletion 
The theoretical focus of the present research is to investigate the relative 
difficulties of two self-regulatory strategies: to stop a consumption episode after it has 
begun, or to not start it in the first place. In order to test the question, it is necessary to 
determine the degree to which each strategy requires effort from the individual 
regulating his or her behaviour; that is, how much psychic cost is required to execute 
each strategy (Shefrin & Thaler, 1988). A recent body of research had established a 
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framework by which the psychological costs of self-regulation can be determined, 
which became known as the “strength model” of self-regulation (e.g., Baumeister et al., 
1998; Baumeister & Heatherton, 1996; Muraven & Baumeister, 2000). This framework 
regards self-regulation as an act of overriding, altering, or inhibiting the natural 
behaviour in which an individual is predisposed to engage (Heatherton & Baumeister, 
1996). It is assumed that actions that require self-regulation draw upon a limited 
psychic resource that becomes temporarily depleted, such that subsequent acts of 
executive function become harder to achieve (Baumeister et al., 1998). This psychic 
resource is variously termed ego strength, ego resource or self-regulatory resource (e.g., 
DeWall et al., 2007), and the temporary depletion of this resource is termed ego depletion 
or self-regulatory resource depletion (for consistency, the rest of this document will refer to 
“self-regulatory resource depletion”, or simply “depletion”.) As will be detailed below, 
the degree to which an individual suffers from depletion can be experimentally inferred 
and quantified. This qualifies the “strength model” to be an appropriate framework to 
examine the psychic cost of self-regulation as required by Shefrin and Thaler (1988) 
The idea of a limited pool of ego resource traces back to Freudian psychoanalytic 
theory (Freud, 1961). Freud believed that individuals’ behavioural motivation is 
influenced by both their internal urgings (manifested in the id) and learned societal 
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inhibitions (manifested in the super-ego), and that one’s ego must mediate between the 
two sources of motivation in order to deal with the external reality. Whilst Freud was 
not explicitly clear on the nature and composition of the resources that fuel this 
mediation, his work asserted that the ego’s task of mediating between short-term 
impulses and long-term interests can impose psychological costs. Subsequent studies 
have established that attempts to control is indeed taxing on the self (Brehm & Self, 
1989), and that when an individual is made accountable for their active volitions, their 
behavioural and cognitive processes change in some ways (e.g., Tetlock & Boettger, 
1989). Baumeister et al. (1998) believed that, despite those previous research efforts, 
understanding of the self’s functions remained relatively poor. This prompted a series 
of research which established a theoretical framework to understand the process of 
control, by focussing on how self-regulatory failure happens (Brehm & Self, 1989). The 
“strength model” was established from this research, attempting to explicate the 
circumstances under which individuals suffer from self-control difficulties, and offers a 
simple yet robust experimental paradigm to aid this investigation. The standard 
experimental paradigm will be detailed in section 3.1 below. 
It is important to recognise that not all difficult or effortful acts lead to self-
regulatory depletion. Behaviours that require minimal overriding or inhibition of urges 
25 
 
 
 
are not classified as self-regulatory, even if they do require effort (Muraven & 
Baumeister, 2000), such as solving moderately difficult mathematical problems (like 
manually calculating three-digit multiplications, e.g., 123 x 456). Despite requiring some 
effortful exertion, solving those mathematical problems generally does not require 
overriding dominant responses, therefore producing no self-regulatory resource 
depletion (Muraven et al., 1998, Study 3). It had also been demonstrated that the effects 
of self-regulatory resource depletion is only temporary (e.g., Baumeister et al., 1998; 
Muraven, Baumeister, & Tice, 1999; Muraven et al., 1998). That is, after an individual is 
depleted following a self-regulatory episode, they regain their full complement of self-
regulatory resource after a period of rest. The process of depletion and resource 
regeneration had been compared to the use and replenishment of muscular strength: 
when a muscle is exercised, its strength is gradually depleted and its subsequent 
performance becomes impaired temporarily; however its strength is restored after a 
suitable period of rest (Muraven et al., 1998). The transient nature of self-regulatory 
depletion makes it necessary to measure any changes in resources resulting from self-
regulation immediately following the exertion. 
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2.3 Objectives and hypotheses of Study 1 
The strength model of self-regulatory resource depletion was established to 
improve understanding of human self-control functions, by attempting to explain how 
self-control failures happen. The model assumes that any prior self-regulatory act leads 
to temporary reduction in one’s ability to self-regulate; however it has yet to question 
the boundary conditions under which such depletion may be augmented or diminished. 
Recent studies have begun to explicate circumstances under which prior depletion may 
differentially affect subsequent depletion. For instance, it had been found that if two 
successive self-regulatory acts were of a similar nature (e.g., if they both involved 
thought-suppression), prior self-regulation actually enhances subsequent self-
regulation, rather than impair it (Dewitte, Bruyneel, & Geyskens, 2009). The current 
research aims to add to this literature by explicating a situation whereby depletion 
effects could be reduced by using different self-regulatory strategies. 
Additionally, studies in the strength model literature had mostly used 
manipulations that involve the Not Start strategy, such as refraining from eating a tasty 
snack, persevering at an unsolvable task, and deliberate manipulation of emotion. 
These manipulations can be translated into not starting, not stopping, and inhibiting 
respectively. Consequently, the question of self-regulating by Stop has not been 
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discussed in depth in the depletion literature. Baumeister and Heatherton (1996) 
suggested that the longer an activity goes on, the harder it is to self-regulate against it, 
which seemed to imply that Stop is more difficult than Not Start; however their 
contention is yet to be empirically tested. Critics (e.g., Carver & Scheier, 1996) have 
argued that if self-regulation were to be defined as an overriding of dominant urges, 
then research on self-regulation should also discuss strategies that involves “doing 
something”, like leaving an unfulfilling career, or ceasing to live a lazy lifestyle and 
starting a fitness regime. The self-regulatory implication of this “expediting costs” 
strategy had also been examined by O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999, 2000). This 
“expediting costs” strategy, however, is not the same as Stop discussed in Thaler’s 
Mirage (1983): cost-expedition involved asking the regulator to immediately incur a cost 
so to attain some future good. Like Not Start, the “expediting costs” strategy requires 
the regulator to not engage in immediate gratification. Thaler’s Mirage, instead, 
questions whether asking the regulator to cease an already-commenced gratifying 
episode is more taxing than to delay/decline that gratification. Neither group of authors 
using the “expediting costs” strategy have specifically provided predictions for Thaler’s 
Mirage, that is, whether Stop is more difficult self-regulatory strategy than Not Start. 
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Additionally, Thaler’s prediction regarding the Mirage (1983) is in contrast with 
what the DMU, a robust economic principle, would have predicted. Thaler suggested 
that Stop would be more difficult to achieve than Not Start; whereas DMU would 
predict in the opposite direction. Thaler’s contention that Not Start is the better strategy 
also opposed against a fundamental economic tenet: that having more choices is 
beneficial, and removal of choices is detrimental. This research aims to add to existing 
research on establishing the boundary conditions of DMU (e.g. Rabin, 2000a), by 
questioning whether DMU can offer adequate description and prediction for the kind of 
situations described by Thaler’s Mirage. 
The first hypothesis of the study follows the prediction made by Thaler’s Mirage 
(1983): it is more depleting to stop an already-commenced episode of consumption, 
than to not start one in the first place. 
H1: A “stop” self-regulatory strategy depletes self-regulatory resources more 
than a “not-start” strategy. 
3 STUDY 1 
This study used an experimental method consisting of two levels of a single 
independent variable (Regulatory Strategy: Stop vs. Not Start), into which participants 
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were randomly allocated. The dependent measure is the amount of self-regulatory 
resource depletion experienced by participants in each group. The standard 
experimental procedure employed in previous strength model research, which is 
explained below, was adopted in this study. 
3.1 Experimental paradigm of the self-regulatory strength model 
Strength model studies (e.g., Baumeister et al., 1998; Muraven et al., 1999; 
Muraven et al., 1998) typically employed a two-phase experimental paradigm (see 
Figure 3-1 below). In a typical study using this procedure, participants are randomly 
allocated to two conditions, Depletion and Control. In phase 1, the Depletion group 
receives a task that requires self-regulatory exertion, whereas the Control group 
completes a task that does not require regulation. In phase 2, both groups complete a 
self-regulatory measure, which is another task that requires self-regulatory exertion. 
The performance of each group in phase 2 is the dependent variable. 
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Figure 3-1: The typical two-task experimental paradigm used in strength model studies. 
The tasks presented to the two groups during phase 1 are usually different in a 
subtle way, but with a crucial difference: whilst the Depletion task is self-regulatory in 
nature, the Control task is similar but without any active overriding of the self, which as 
discussed earlier is the definition of self-regulation (Heatherton & Baumeister, 1996). 
For example, one study asked participants to watch an emotionally upsetting film; the 
Depletion group was told to suppress their emotional reaction towards the film, whilst 
the Control group received no emotional-suppression instructions (Muraven et al., 1998, 
Experiment 1). It has consistently been shown that participants in the Depletion group 
consistently show inferior performance in the phase 2 self-regulatory task than 
participants in the Control group. Given that Depletion and Control groups differ only in 
the nature of the task performed in phase 1, the Depletion group’s inferior performance 
in phase 2 is assumed to be caused their engagement in self-regulatory (vs. non-self-
Experimental 
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Control Group 
Self-Regulatory 
Task 
Non-Self 
Regulatory 
Task 
Self-Regulatory 
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regulatory) activities in phase 1. Based on this result, strength model researchers 
postulate that acts of self-regulation temporarily deplete some internal resources, which 
subsequently impedes individuals’ self-regulatory performance in phase 2. 
3.2 Overview of study 
In study 1, participants were randomly allocated to one of two experimental 
conditions: Stop and Not Start. As this study’s main aim was to compare the two self-
regulatory strategies’ relative difficulty against each other, it was not necessary to 
designate a control group. Each participant was first asked to rate their preference for 
two problem-solving games (either a general knowledge quiz or a Sudoku game, details 
of which will be discussed further below); participants in the Stop group were asked to 
first complete the game which they chose as more favourable followed by their less-
preferred game (thereby having to self-regulate by ceasing a desirable activity), whereas 
participants in the Not Start group were asked to complete their less-favoured game 
first followed by their more-favoured game (thereby self-regulating by resisting from 
starting a desirable activity).  
To increase participants’ motivation and to prevent them from completely 
avoiding the less-favoured game, participants were informed that they have an 
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opportunity to win a cash prize if they score highly in their more-favoured task, but to 
be eligible for the prize they must achieve a certain level of performance (or “pass”) the 
less-favoured task. The score required to qualify for the prize draw was never revealed 
to participants to avoid changing motivations when they approach or surpass the target 
(DeWall, Baumeister, & Vohs, 2008, Experiment 6). Participants were given a fixed 
amount of time (20 minutes) to complete as much of the two tasks as possible, but the 
amount of time that they spend on each task was left to their discretion. Since the 
participants were unaware of the score required to qualify for the prize, the best way for 
participants to maximise their scores on both tasks would have been to spend an equal 
amount of time on each task, i.e., ten minutes each. Participants were prompted on this 
point prior to the study’s commencement but the ten minute suggestion was neither 
repeated again nor enforced. This was done to ensure that the participants’ responses 
were performed with relatively little immediate external control (Kirschenbaum, 1987), 
thus amplifying the effect of self-regulation when it is eventually measured. Participants 
were also asked in advance how they intended to allocate those 20 minutes in order to 
gauge whether violation of this committed time (and the extent to which this 
commitment had been violated) had an effect on depletion (see section 3.4.2 for details). 
The length of each task had been designed to ensure that no participant would finish 
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either task within the time provided. Finally, the allocation of task order and which task 
carried the prize-winning opportunity was ostensibly random to avoid detection of the 
“favoured task = prize-winning opportunity” contingency. 
In line with past self-regulation resource model research (e.g., Baumeister et al., 
1998; Muraven et al., 1998), the impact of each self-regulatory strategy was determined 
via a measure that was designed to appear unrelated to the tasks presented in phase 1. 
Using a depletion measure that bore no obvious relationship to prior self-regulatory 
tasks demonstrates that a wide array of seemingly unrelated acts can draw upon the 
same pool of psychic resource (Muraven & Baumeister, 2000). The dependent measure 
was presented immediately after participants decided to end the first task. After the 
dependent measure was administered, participants were free to use the remainder of 
their allowed 20 minutes to complete their second task. 
3.3 Method 
3.3.1 Description of stimuli. 
The general knowledge quiz consists of multiple-choice questions relating to a 
wide variety of fields and discipline, including current affairs, geography, history, and 
cultural events. An example of a general knowledge quiz item would be as follows: 
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Which is the capital city of Australia? 
A. Sydney 
B. Melbourne 
C. Canberra 
D. Brisbane 
E. Launceston 
Participants were informed of the correct solution and their current score after 
every ten questions. 
The Sudoku game, meanwhile, involved logical and spatial reasoning. The 
objective of the game is to fill a 9-by-9 grid (subdivided into nine 3-by-3 grids) with the 
numbers 1 to 9, such that each row, column and each of the nine subdivided 3-by-3 grid 
contains only one instance of each number. At the start of the game, some numbers 
were already filled in, and the player’s task was to fill the gaps to satisfy the conditions 
explained above (an example is shown in Figure 3-2 below). Even though Sudoku can 
involve grids of other dimensions, this 9-by-9 configuration is typical of Sudoku games 
circulated daily in Sydney’s metropolitan newspapers and magazines. The games used 
in this study were adopted from the website www.sudoku.com.au. 
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Figure 3-2: Sample of a Sudoku game, at its starting position. 
These tasks were chosen because they are both popular and familiar to 
undergraduate marketing students – the potential participant pool – yet each task 
requires a different mental process. Specifically, completing the general knowledge quiz 
requires the use of Crystallised Intelligence, which involves using information that is 
accumulated via prior learning and experience. On the other hand, the Sudoku game 
requires the use of Fluid Intelligence, which involves adaptation to novel situations and 
logical skills and is not dependent on acculturated knowledge. Crystallised and Fluid 
Intelligences were considered direct opposites to each other (Cattell, 1963). The 
questions for each task were carefully selected and tested to ensure that the two tasks 
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are seen as approximately equally difficult and enjoyable. This was confirmed by 
subsequent manipulation checks (please refer to Section 3.4.1 for details.)  
3.3.2 Participants. 
Two hundred and five marketing undergraduate and postgraduate students 
from the Faculty of Economics and Business, University of Sydney, took part in the 
study in exchange for course credit. Participants were recruited via an online 
announcement system operated by the Faculty, which describes the study as one that 
investigates people’s problem-solving abilities. Participants are informed at the time of 
recruitment of the incentives: namely course credits and an opportunity to win a $200 
cash prize for superior performance in a problem-solving exercise. 
3.3.3 Dependent measure. 
In this study, the dependent measure consisted of a “word-checking task” 
adopted from Moller, Deci and Ryan (2006, Experiment 3), presented as a “attention to 
detail” test. The task was chosen as it is unrelated to the depletion manipulation, yet 
still required self-regulatory exertion (Muraven et al., 1998). This is typically used in the 
strength model paradigm to show that all exertions of the self draws from a common 
psychic resource. In this world-checking task, participants were asked to read a two-
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page excerpt and cross off words according to several conflicting sets of rules. It was 
argued that attempting to complete this task requires overriding one’s dominant 
response of simply following one rule and ignoring the others, thus is self-regulatory in 
nature (Baumeister et al., 1998, Experiment 4). A “self-regulation score” (number of 
correctly marked items minus number of incorrectly omitted items) is the main 
dependent measure (in accordance to Moller et al., 2006). 
3.3.4 Procedure. 
Participants attended the study in small groups of 1 to 8 in Faculty computer 
laboratories. Upon arrival, participants were greeted, received instructions, and gave 
their informed consent (see appendix B for consent form.) Afterwards, participants 
were randomly allocated to individual computer workstations, where they read the 
following greeting message (see appendix E for all screenshots of the program): 
“Welcome to the Problem Solving Study. We would like you to work on 
two different problem solving tasks: A General Knowledge Quiz, and a Sudoku 
Challenge. You have the chance to $200 cash prize if you do well in one of these 
tasks; we will tell you which one later. You have 20 minutes to complete both 
tasks.” 
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The study administrator further reinforced that although there is no clear 
requirement on how long each participant must spend on each task, it is advisable to 
allocate ten minutes to each. Participants were informed that they would not be allowed 
to switch back and forth between the two tasks, once they had decided to end the first 
task, they could not return to it later. Participants were then shown a detailed example 
of each task, during which they were again reminded that they have full control over 
their timing, by pressing a clearly labelled button. A timer was also clearly visible on 
the computer screen, indicating the number of minutes elapsed from the time 
participants commence the first task.  
After participants saw an example of the two tasks, they were asked to rate how 
much they favoured each task (on a continuous scale anchored with Unfavourable [0] to 
Favourable [100]), and the number of minutes they had planned to spend on each task. 
Afterwards participants received a message informing them which task they would 
commence first, which task would carry the opportunity to win the $200 cash prize, and 
which task they must pass in order to qualify for the cash prize. As stated in section 3.2 
above, participants in Stop received their more-preferred task first, and those in Not 
Start received the less-preferred task first; in both cases (and unbeknownst to the 
participants), the more-preferred task always carried the prize-winning opportunity, 
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and the non-preferred task carried the requirement to pass. If a participant gave equal 
favourability ratings for both tasks, they would be randomly allocated to either 
commence with the general knowledge quiz or the Sudoku game, and the prize-
winning opportunity would be allocated according to their assigned condition (i.e., if 
Stop – task 1 has the incentive; if Not Start – task 2 has the incentive). Participants were 
also asked to estimate the number of minutes they plan to spend on each task. After that, 
they were asked to commence task 1. 
When participants decided to terminate the first task, they pressed a button on 
the program clearly labelled “Finish the [Name of Task]”. They were then asked to 
provide their ratings on the following: (participants were also informed that the 20 
minute timer was temporarily suspended, in order to prevent them from rushing 
through these items). 
• How much they have enjoyed the first task (“Not at all enjoyable” [0] – “Very 
enjoyable” [100];) 
• How difficult it was to stop (for Stop condition)/persist with (for Not Start 
condition) the first task (“Not at all difficult” [0] – “Very enjoyable” [100];) 
• How frustrating it was to stop (for Stop condition)/persist with (for Not Start 
condition) the first task (“Not at all frustrating” [0] – “Very frustrating” [100];) 
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• How difficult was the first task in general (“Not at all difficult” [0] – “Very 
difficult” [100];) 
• The 16-item Brief Mood Introspection Scale (BMIS) (Mayer & Gaschke, 1988). 
Typical self-regulation studies (e.g., Baumeister et al., 1998; Muraven et al., 1998) 
included this measure to test an alternative explanation that differences in 
depletion were due to differential moods induced by the depletion manipulation. 
After they had completed these items, participants were presented with a test of 
“attention to detail”, which in fact was the dependent measure. Participants had not 
seen or been informed of this task prior to this point. The dependent measure consisted 
of an excerpt of approximately 500 words, taken from the novel The Bell Jar (Plath, 1963) 
(see appendix F for excerpt.) Participants were asked to tick off every word that 
contains the letter E or R, except: 
• When the E is next to another vowel (e.g., MEAT;) 
• When the R is between two vowels (e.g., BORING;) 
• When the two above rules conflict (e.g., READING – R is not between two 
vowels; but E is next to one). 
These rules were adopted from previous studies in self-regulatory depletion 
(Baumeister et al., 1998, Experiment 4; Moller et al., 2006, Experiment 3). It was 
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contended that whilst the initial rule (crossing off all words containing E or R) is 
sufficient easy to follow, the presence of the other rules require participants to override 
their dominant response to simply follow the initial rule. This overriding makes this 
task self-regulatory in nature. In accordance to Moller et al. (2006, p. 1032), a “self-
regulatory score” was derived (by subtracting the number of correct responses from the 
number of incorrectly marked responses) as the main dependent variable, to avoid 
underestimating the depletion level of participants who simply cross off every instance 
of E or R, or overestimating the depletion level of those who sought to avoid errors by 
crossing off very few Es or Rs. 
When participants had completed the dependent measure, they returned their 
responses to the study administer. They were then instructed to spend the remainder of 
their allotted 20 minutes on the second task. When they reached the end of that time, 
participants were fully debriefed, thanked, and dismissed. (Please see appendix C for 
the debrief form.) 
3.4 Analysis and Results  
The final sample consisted of 153 datapoints, after eliminating those of 
participants who failed to complete the dependent measure (N = 17), or failed to give 
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preference ratings for the two tasks (N = 32), or whose task 1 completion time data was 
defective (N = 3, the rationale for using task 1 completion time data will be explained in 
section 3.4.2 below). Please note that even if the data of participants who did not give 
their task-preference rating or had defective task 1 completion time data were included, 
the direction of the result does not change. 
3.4.1 Manipulation checks. 
Task 1-task 2 relative preferences. There is a significant difference in each 
condition’s (pre-study) preference ratings for the two tasks, which is in the intended 
direction. Recall that Stop involves stopping a preferred activity and moving to a non-
preferred one, whereas Not Start involves the opposite. Therefore it should be expected 
that Stop participants would prefer task 1 over task 2, and Not Start vice versa. Indeed, it 
was found that Stop participants significantly preferred task 1 to task 2 (N = 76, M TASK 1 = 
72.37, SD TASK 1 = 15.99; M TASK 2 = 41.64, SD TASK 2 = 23.46; t = 11.54, p < .001;) and Not Start 
participants showed the reverse pattern (N = 80, M TASK 1 = 45.30; SD TASK 1 = 21.17; M TASK 2 
= 75.81; SD TASK 2 = 13.31; t = -11.84, p < .001).  
Difficulty and frustration of manipulation. Stop participants also rated the 
manipulation that they underwent (i.e., having to cease their more-preferred task) as 
more difficult (N STOP = 68, N NOT START = 72, M STOP = 59.19, M NOT START = 44.21, SD STOP = 
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24.27, SD NOT START = 24.34, t = 3.65, p < .01) and frustrating (N STOP = 68, N NOT START = 72, M 
STOP = 56.63, M NOT START = 46.29, SD STOP = 23.67, SD NOT START = 26.92, t = 2.42, p = .02) to 
achieve than those in Not Start (i.e., having to resist from prematurely engaging in the 
more-preferred task). These results provide some preliminary indication that the Stop 
manipulation is more effortful than Not Start. 
Relative preferences for the two tasks. Clearly, each participant will differ in his or 
her evaluation of the two tasks and how the tasks compare. It is possible that 
participants in one condition may indicate a higher relative liking for their preferred 
task than the other condition. This increased liking, if confirmed, could lead to the 
alternative argument that self-regulation in that condition is more difficult because 
participants had to regulate against a relatively more attractive activity. Ultimately, this 
relative preference did not significantly differ across the two Regulatory Strategy 
conditions (N STOP = 76, N NOT START = 80, M STOP = 30.72, M NOT START = 30.51, SD STOP = 23.22, 
SD NOT START = 23.04, t = .06, p = .96), indicating that any differences in the depletion 
measure cannot be attributed to greater relative liking for the preferred task in either 
Regulatory Strategy condition. 
Perceived difficulty and performance of task 1. There were no significant differences 
in the two groups’ ratings of the difficulty (N STOP = 68, N NOT START = 72, M STOP = 57.41, M 
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NOT START = 50.99, SD STOP = 26.49, SD NOT START = 25.55, t = 1.46, p = .15) and performance (N 
STOP = 76, N NOT START = 80, M STOP = 43.66, M NOT START = 46.28, SD STOP = 21.59, SD NOT START = 
22.81, t = -.74, p = .46) on task 1 (during which participants underwent self-regulation). 
This eliminates the potential confound that depletion effects could have arisen from Not 
Start participants (for whom task 1 is the less favoured task compared to Task 2), in 
comparison to Stop participants, rating task 1 as more difficult and perceiving inferior 
task 1 performance. 
Relative difficulty rating between the two games used. The general knowledge quiz 
was rated significantly more difficult than the Sudoku game, although this difference 
was not significant across the two Regulatory Strategy conditions. This was revealed by 
a Regulatory Strategy x task type 2-way ANOVA, evidenced by the non-significant 
interaction between the two factors (M STOP = 57.01, M NOT START = 60.56, M GENERAL KNOWLEDGE 
= 67.87, M SUDOKU = 49.78, M STOP/ GENERAL KNOWLEDGE = 66.38, M STOP/ SUDOKU = 47.63, M NOT START/ 
GENERAL KNOWLEDGE = 69.29, M NOT START/ SUDOKU = 51.83; SD STOP = 25.26, SD NOT START = 23.34, SD 
GENERAL KNOWLEDGE = 17.59, SD SUDOKU = 26.70, SD STOP/ GENERAL KNOWLEDGE = 17.72, SD STOP/ SUDOKU 
= 28.15, SD NOT START/ GENERAL KNOWLEDGE = 17.47, SD NOT START/ SUDOKU = 25.24, F REGULATORY STRATEGY 
(1, 312) = 1.92 p = .17; F TASK TYPE (1, 312) = 50.00, p < .01; F REGULATORY STRATEGY x TASK TYPE (1, 312) 
= .06 p = .80). Had the relative difficulty of the general knowledge quiz been 
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significantly higher in one of the conditions, it may be argued that any differences in 
depletion found in that condition is simply attributed to the greater difficulty of the task. 
As can be seen this was not the case. 
Mood state. There were also no differences between the two groups on mood as 
measured by the four subscales of BMIS (Mayer & Gaschke, 1988) (N STOP = 76, N NOT START 
= 80. Pleasant/ Unpleasant scale: M STOP = 2.95, M NOT START = 1.90, SD STOP = 4.68, SD NOT 
START = 6.17, t = 1.19, p = .24; Arousal/ Calm scale: M STOP = 16.79, M NOT START = 16.81, SD 
STOP = 5.60, SD NOT START = 4.20, t = -.03, p = .98; Positive/ Tired scale: M STOP = 7.29, M NOT 
START = 6.66, SD STOP = 3.47, SD NOT START = 3.28, t = 1.16, p = .25; Negative/ Relaxed scale: M 
STOP = 7.37, M NOT START = 7.91, SD STOP = 3.17, SD NOT START = 2.91, t = -1.12, p = .27). This 
finding agrees with that found in previous self-regulation research (Baumeister et al., 
1998), meaning that any differences found in the dependent variable cannot be 
attributed to differential mood state or arousal elicited by the two Regulatory Strategy 
conditions. 
As previously stated, in order to maximise the difference in liking for the two 
tasks and magnify the effects of the manipulation, participants’ preferred task contained 
the opportunity to win a cash prize, but they were required to score sufficiently well on 
the non-preferred task to qualify for the prize draw. This pass mark was never revealed 
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to participants, to prevent participants changing their motivation as they approach or 
surpass that pass mark (DeWall et al., 2008, Experiment 6). As part of the manipulation 
check, participants were asked what they believed the pass mark was. Seventy-nine 
participants recorded their response as zero. Since the survey was delivered 
electronically, it was not possible to determine whether this means they believed that 
there was no pass mark, or that they simply failed to answer the question. Please note 
that even if the data for these participants were removed, the general direction of the 
results did not change. 
3.4.2 Results. 
As discussed earlier, Stop participants rated their strategy (i.e., having to cease 
their more-preferred task) as more difficult  and frustrating to achieve than those in Not 
Start (i.e., having to resist from prematurely engaging in the more-preferred task). This 
represents preliminary indications that Stop is more effortful than Not Start; however 
this relationship can only be fully tested by examining the differences in self-regulatory 
depletion across the two regulatory strategies. 
As stated in the beginning of section 3.4, the final sample consisted of 153 
datapoints, after eliminating those of participants who failed to complete certain key 
measures. Please note that even if the data of participants who did not give their task-
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preference rating or had defective task 1 completion time data were included, the 
direction of the result does not change. As stated in section 3.2, the dependent variable 
consists of the difference between the number of correct and incorrect responses, in 
accordance to previous studies (Moller et al., 2006). An ANOVA was conducted to test 
the difference in depletion score between the two Regulatory Strategy conditions.  
An additional covariate, task 1 overtime, was also included, which reflects the 
number of minutes participants actually spent on task 1 that exceeded their stated pre-
task 1 intended completion time. This covariate was required because there were 
significant differences across the two conditions on this measure (as revealed by an 
independent-samples t-test with task 1 overtime as the dependent variable: M STOP = 2.73; 
M NOT START = 1.15; SD STOP = 4.50, SD NOT START = 5.57, t = 2.41; p = .02). It is possible that Stop 
participants suffered from greater self-regulatory demands not because of the strategy 
they used, but because they spent more time than they had committed in comparison to 
Not Start participants; that is, they may have under-regulated (spending more time than 
they should have on a more enjoyable task). It may be questioned why this analysis 
used task 1 overtime as a covariate, rather than simply using the number of minutes 
participants spent on task 1. It is felt that task 1 overtime can better capture under- or 
over-regulation, because participants were free to nominate how many minutes they 
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wished to spend on each task. If a simple measure of time spent on task 1 were to be 
used, then a Stop participant who spent 12 minutes on task 1 may be interpreted as 
being less regulated than one who spent 10 minutes. However, this interpretation could 
be incorrect if each participant’s intended task 1 time was taken into account. 
Specifically, if the first participant had intended to spend 13 minutes on task 1 (and 
eventually spending 12), and the second participant had intended to spend 9 minutes 
(and eventually spending 10), then the interpretation would be reversed: namely, the 
first participant has over-regulated by one minute, and the second participant has 
under-regulated by one minute. 
The ANOVA revealed that the mean depletion score for Stop was significantly 
lower than that for Not Start (M STOP = 126.34; M NOT START = 144.39; SD STOP = 51.29, SD NOT 
START = 46.70, F(1, 150) = 4.49; p = .04), indicating that Stop was the more depleting 
strategy. Task 1 Overtime was found to be a non-significant contributor (F TASK 1 OVERTIME 
(1, 150) = .34; p = .56), meaning that the longer Overtime Stop participants spent in task 1 
(compared to Not Start) did not affect the main finding. Please see appendix A for 
outputs from the SPSS analysis. 
As seen in section 3.4.1, factors such as mood, perceived task difficulty and 
perceived task performance during the self-regulatory phase were ruled out as potential 
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factors influencing differences in depletion patterns found in this study. Even though 
the general knowledge quiz was seen as significantly more difficult than the Sudoku 
game, this difference was not significantly different across the two Regulatory Strategy 
conditions and therefore did not impact the outcome. 
3.5 Discussion of study 1 
Study 1 provided some evidence supporting Thaler’s (1983) contention that self-
regulating by moderating consumption may be a mere illusion. When a choice exists 
between stopping a tempting activity and not starting it at all, the latter choice is 
probably the better decision. In study 1, it was found that the Stop strategy produced 
greater self-regulatory depletion compared to Not Start. This means that users of the 
Stop strategy (compared those who chose Not Start) are more likely to fail in their self-
regulatory attempts. This effect was not affected by individuals’ mood state, as shown 
by the BMIS, consistent with findings in previous self-regulatory studies (Baumeister et 
al., 1998). Additionally, a number of other alternative explanations had been ruled out, 
namely that participants in Not Start (who were required to complete the non-favoured 
task first), compared to Stop, suffered greater depletion because they perceived the task 
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they received during the depletion manipulation to be more difficult, or that their 
performance on that task is inferior, by virtue of their lower preference for that task. 
As discussed above, it was found that Stop participants spent significantly more 
time on task 1 than Not Start participants. This variation in itself is not surprising, given 
that the Stop manipulation required making task 1 both highly favoured and lucrative 
(carrying the prize-winning opportunity). However it was necessary to determine 
whether this variation had an impact on the relationship between self-regulatory 
strategies and resource depletion, because it could have been argued that Stop was more 
depleting simply because participants in that condition spent more time self-regulating. 
This alternative explanation was not supported: analyses revealed that the amount of 
time participants spent on task 1 that exceeded their intended duration (task 1 overtime) 
did not significantly contribute towards the overall relationship between Regulatory 
Strategies and self-regulatory resource depletion. This result is in fact predicted by 
previous finding, in that regardless whether self-regulation was successful or not in task 
1, self-regulatory depletion still took place in task 2 (e.g., Baumeister et al., 1998; Vohs & 
Heatherton, 2000). In other words, depletion in subsequent regulatory tasks would still 
manifest even if self-regulation in the prior task had been successful. In this study, the 
difference between the intended and actual time spent on task 1 can be considered as 
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indicative of their success or failure in achieving self-regulation. Specifically, 
participants who ceased task 1 on-time (in both strategies) or persisted more than they 
intended to (i.e., going over-time in Not Start or under-time in Stop) can be considered 
as successful self-regulators; whereas those who did not persist more than they 
intended to (i.e., going over-time in Stop or under-time in Not Start) can be considered 
as having failed in self-regulation. Those abovementioned strength-model studies 
explain why the amount of time spent on each task did not have an impact on the 
relationship between regulatory strategies and depletion. 
There is one other possible explanation that the procedure and data in study 1 
could not rule out: the psychological distance perceived by participants towards the more-
favoured activity. This notion will be further elaborated below, but it is plausible that 
the perceived psychological distance differed between tasks and had systematically 
affected the results of study 1. A review of the psychological distance literature follows. 
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4 PSYCHOLOGICAL DISTANCE 
4.1 Review of the psychological distance literature 
The notion of psychological distance, and its role in human functioning and 
decision-making, had long been recognised. Jevons (1905) suggested that people feel 
pleasure or pain when they anticipate an event in the future, and the length of time 
before an event takes place can influence the degree of such pleasure or pain. Lewin 
(1936) expanded on Jevon’s contention by suggesting that people’s behaviour, at any 
given point in time, is influenced by “distances” from a myriad of stimuli in the 
environment, the distances of which can be altered to be closer to, or away from, 
people’s conscious perception.  
Whilst Lewin did not directly specify how an event’s “distance” affects 
behaviour, his views gave rise to two important implications. First, it is possible to 
systematically manipulate the psychological distance of a stimulus in order to isolate 
the effect of changing that distance. Second, psychological distance is not limited to just 
any one sensory dimension; it is possible to remove an event from people’s direct 
experience along any sensory dimension (Trope, Liberman, & Wakslak, 2007). Some of 
the proposed dimensions include temporal, spatial, social and hypotheticality (i.e., how 
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likely an event is to occur). Psychological distance is said to be increased if the event 
under consideration is removed from one’s immediate experience along any one of 
those dimensions (Bar-Anan, Liberman, & Trope, 2006). The different dimensions of 
psychological distance are said to be interrelated (Trope et al., 2007), meaning that if a 
stimulus is psychologically removed along one dimension, its effects should be 
compensated by moving the stimulus along another dimension in the opposite 
direction. 
Studies across various disciplines have examined how an event’s perceived 
psychological distance can influence the perceiver’s judgement of it. Part of the 
literature discussed in section 2.1 – time-inconsistency, present-biased change in 
preferences (e.g., Ainslie, 1975; Loewenstein, 1996; O'Donoghue & Rabin, 1999; Strotz, 
1955) – is concerned with how one’s preferences relating to a particular event changes 
as it draws near, in a way that tends to favour immediate gratification that may conflict 
with the individual’s long-term interests. The role of psychological distance had also 
been examined in relation to delay of gratification; specifically, researchers have 
investigated how changing the spatial distance of a reward influences children’s ability 
to decline that reward in favour of a delayed, yet greater, reward (e.g., Metcalfe & 
Mischel, 1999; Mischel & Ebbesen, 1970). Research on the human self-regulatory process 
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has been augmented by the strength model of self-regulatory resource depletion (e.g., 
Baumeister et al., 1998; Muraven et al., 1998); however despite the link between 
psychological distance and delay of gratification having been established, the strength 
model literature is yet to examine in detail the role of psychological distance in resource 
depletion. Since psychological distance was identified as a possible explanation for the 
results found in study 1, this offers an opportunity for study 2 to establish this link. 
4.2 How is psychological distance relevant to the current investigation?  
In study 1, Stop participants were instructed to complete the more-favoured task 
first and switch to the less-favoured task; whereas Not Start participants were required 
to complete the less-favoured task first, during which they had to resist from switching 
to the more-favoured task. Accordingly, during task 1, Stop participants have 
immediate access to the more-favoured task; whereas Not Start participants had no 
access to their more-favoured task, but could only anticipate the more-favoured task 
later in time. In other words, during task 1, all Not Start (vs. Stop) participants faced a 
greater psychological distance from the more-favoured task. 
In view of the earlier discussion on how psychological distance could impact 
upon self-control, it may be that the perceived psychological distance from the more 
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favoured task could have systematically affected the results in study 1. Specifically, it is 
possible that Stop was more depleting because the favoured task was closer to 
participants’ immediate experience than it was in Not Start. Studies in delay of 
gratification found that the presence of either the immediate or the delayed reward 
reduces delay behaviour (Mischel & Ebbesen, 1970). This potential confound will be 
addressed in study 2 by separating the effects of psychological distance and regulatory 
strategies. This is achieved by introducing an additional factor to independently 
manipulate the psychological distance of task 2 when participants engage in self-
regulation during task 1. This new Psychological Distance factor has two levels: Near 
(where task 2 was visible to participants as they completed task 1) and Far (where task 2 
was not visible; i.e., the same configuration used in study 1). The addition of Near serves 
to make the favoured task immediately visible to Not Start participants during task 1. 
To balance the design, Stop participants will also see the less-favoured task when they 
complete task 1 (For full details of study 2 please refer to section 5 below). 
The Psychological Distance factor used in study 2 adopts the assumption that 
psychological distance is multidimensional (Trope et al., 2007). In study 1, for Stop, the 
regulatory act is temporally distant (in that it was not due to happen for a short while;) 
in the Near Psychological Distance condition of study 2, by making the contents of task 2 
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immediately visible during task 1, the regulatory act is made physically proximal. 
Similarly, in study 1 for Not Start, the more-favoured task is temporally distant; in the 
Near Psychological Distance condition in study 2, the more-favoured task is made 
physically proximal. Since psychological distance dimensions are said to be interrelated 
(Trope et al., 2007), the effects of reducing the perceived distance of task 2 along the 
physical dimension should equal out the effect of increased temporal distance from task 
2.  
5 STUDY 2 
5.1 Introduction to study 2 
In study 1, it was established that the Stop strategy was more depleting than Not 
Start. Study 2 aimed to examine a potential alternative explanation: namely, to 
determine whether the psychological distance from the more-favoured task may have 
systematically affected the results found in study 1. This was achieved by 
independently manipulating the effect of psychological distance of task 2 as 
participants were completing task 1. Study 2 included a Psychological Distance 
manipulation with two levels: Near (where the anticipated task 2 was made present 
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during task 1) and Far (where the anticipated task 2 was not made present during task 1, 
i.e., identical to the setting in study 1). This new condition was fully crossed with the 
Regulatory Strategy condition, creating a 2 (Regulatory Strategy: Stop vs. Not Start) x 2 
(Psychological Distance: Near vs. Far) full factorial design. 
The manipulation of the Regulatory Strategy condition was similar to that used 
in study 1; that is, participants were asked to complete two tasks diverging in 
favourability, with Not Start participants completing the less-favourable task first 
(thereby self-regulating by resisting from switching to the favourable task), and Stop 
participants completing the more-favourable task first (thereby self-regulating by 
having to end the favourable task). This manipulation was slightly modified in study 2: 
rather than allowing participants to rate their own favourability for each task (and 
allocating task order according to their relative favourability ratings), the participants 
received two tasks that differed highly in favourability: a trivia quiz (identical to the 
general knowledge quiz seen in study 1) which was designed to be relatively enjoyable, 
and a mathematics task consisting solely of manually calculating three-digit 
multiplication problems, designed to be relatively uninteresting. The three-digit 
multiplication task was previously used by Muraven et al (1998) as a task that requires 
some exertion but does not deplete regulatory resources. As such, Not Start participants 
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completed the mathematics task (less-favourable) first; whereas those in Stop completed 
the trivia quiz (more-favourable) first. 
The presentation of the tasks was designed carefully to maximally enhance the 
relative favourability for the two tasks. For instance, the layout of the trivia quiz was 
made colourful and vibrant, whereas the mathematics task was presented like an 
examination paper (see appendix E for screenshots of the program used to deliver the 
stimuli). Once again, in order to enhance interest in the favourable task whilst keeping 
the less-favourable task relevant, participants were offered the chance to enter a $200 
cash prize by performing strongly in the trivia quiz, but they must to perform to a 
sufficient standard – achieve a “Pass Mark” – in the mathematics task to be eligible. 
Like in study 1, this “Pass Mark” was never revealed to participants, in order to prevent 
arousal levels as participants approach the target score (DeWall et al., 2008). As will be 
explained in Section 5.4.1 below, manipulation checks revealed that most participants 
rated the trivia quiz more favourably than the mathematics task, and that the relative 
favourability of the two tasks did not differ across any of the experimental conditions.  
The Psychological Distance manipulation was operationalised by manipulating 
the manner in which the two tasks were presented on the computer screen. Specifically, 
in the Near condition, the two tasks were shown simultaneously on the screen, by 
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splitting the screen in two halves, with each task occupying one half of the screen. This 
means that when participants were completing task 1, they can also see task 2 on the 
screen, making task 2 immediately available in the participants’ conscious experience. 
On the other hand, the visual arrangement of the two tasks in the Far condition was 
identical to study 1, i.e., tasks 1 and 2 were presented sequentially, with participants 
unable to see task 2 when they were completing study 1. Please refer to section 5.3.2 for 
more details on the procedures. 
5.2 Summary of predictions and hypotheses 
In summary, results found in study 1 should be replicated in the Far condition, 
namely Stop should be more depleting than Not Start. This is because, in Far, the 
manner of presentation of the two tasks was identical to the configuration used in study 
1. On the other hand, effects found in study 1 should disappear in the Near condition, as 
the perceived psychological distance of task 2 is reduced (by making task 2 immediately 
available to participants’ conscious experience during self-regulation in task 1). 
H2:  Psychological distance will moderate the efficacy of the regulatory 
strategies: 
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H2a: When Psychological Distance is Far (i.e., when the contents of task 2 is not 
made visible during task 1), Stop is more depleting than Not Start (i.e., 
study 1 results will be replicated). 
H2b: When Psychological Distance is Near (i.e., when the contents of task 2 is 
made visible during task 1), Stop should be no more depleting than Not 
Start. 
5.3 Method 
5.3.1 Participants. 
One hundred and twenty-four undergraduate and postgraduate marketing 
students from the Faculty of Economics and Business, University of Sydney, took part 
in the study in exchange for course credit. Participants were recruited via an online 
announcement system operated by the Faculty, which describes the study as one that 
investigates people’s problem-solving abilities. Participants were informed at the time 
of recruitment of the incentives: namely course credits and the opportunity to win a 
$200 cash prize for superior performance in the trivia quiz. 
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5.3.2 Procedure and manipulations. 
Participants attended the study in small groups (1-8) in faculty computer 
laboratories. Upon arrival, participants were greeted, received instructions, and signed 
a consent form (see appendix B for consent form). Afterwards, participants were 
randomly allocated to individual computer workstations, each containing a personal 
computer, blank papers, and a set of stereo headphones. Each computer displayed the 
following greeting message: 
“Welcome to today’s study. You have 20 minutes to work on two exercises: 
• Trivia Challenge - try to answer as many questions as possible for the chance to win a 
prize. The top 20 performers in the Trivia Challenge will enter a draw for a $200 cash 
prize. 
• Mathematics Quiz – solve some simple maths problems, e.g. 123 x 456. 
You must achieve a certain pass-mark in the Mathematics Quiz to enter the Trivia 
Challenge Cash Prize. If you don't pass the Maths Quiz, you cannot enter the Cash 
Prize.” 
The study administrator further reinforced that, even though there was no 
stipulation on how much time participants should spend on each task, it was advisable 
to allocate an equal amount of time (i.e., ten minutes) to each. This advice was given to 
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remind participants that both tasks were equally important towards winning the cash 
prize: superior performance on the trivia quiz was obviously needed, but since 
participants were not made aware of the “Pass Mark” required for the mathematics task, 
they would need to maximise their performance on that task too to become eligible for 
the prize draw. As such, the best strategy would have been to spend an equal amount of 
time on each task, that is, ten minutes each. 
Participants were then shown a detailed example of the first task (Stop condition: 
trivia quiz; Not Start condition: mathematics task), during which they were again 
reminded of their control over the timing. Participants were also informed that the 
computer program would end once the participant has spent a total of 20 minutes on 
the two tasks. After these instructions, participants proceeded to their first allocated 
task. 
The trivia quiz was identical in fashion to that used in study 1 (see section 3.3.1;) 
namely, the participant was asked a series of multiple-choice questions pertaining to 
general knowledge, each containing four alternatives, and they received performance 
feedback and correct answers after every ten questions. The mathematics task consisted 
of a series of three-by-three-digit multiplication items (e.g., 123 x 456). Participants were 
explicitly forbidden to use calculators or other electronic aids to complete this task, with 
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blank papers provided for rough working, and they were not given any performance 
feedback throughout this component, in order to prevent changing in arousal resulting 
from knowledge of the results (DeWall et al., 2008). 
When participants decided to terminate task 1, they clicked on a button on the 
computer screen. Upon that, participants were shown the dependent measure, 
presented as a “Listening Exercise”, and were told that the 20 minute timer was 
temporarily suspended during this exercise (in order to prevent participants from 
rushing through the dependent measure thinking that they may run out of time to 
complete task 2). The dependent measure consisted of a dichotic listening task, during 
which participants were required to listen for a series of words in their left ear, and 
write down all words they hear that fit a specific rule (in this case, words that contain 
the letter M or P), whilst ignoring a political speech delivered in their right ear 
(Baumeister, DeWall, Ciarocco, & Twenge, 2005, Experiment 4). For left-handed 
participants, the left/right ear designation was reversed, in accordance to procedure 
used by Baumeister et al. (2005) (See appendix D for a list of words used.) 
When participants completed the dependent measure, they were shown detailed 
instructions of task 2 (trivia quiz if in Not Start; mathematics task if in Stop). The 
respective incentives for each task were reiterated to participants (i.e., opportunity for 
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the cash prize in the trivia quiz; requirement to pass to be eligible for the cash prize in 
the mathematics task), and they were allowed to complete that task for the remainder of 
the 20 minutes. By this stage, all participants had undergone self-regulatory exertion 
and had their depletion level tested, therefore the remainder of the 20 minute period 
was merely to fulfil the cover story. Once participants have spent a total of 20 minutes 
on the two tasks, the program terminated automatically, after which they were asked 
the following questions: 
• How much have you enjoyed each of the two tasks (“Not at all enjoyable” [0] – 
“Very enjoyable” [100];) 
• How difficult was it to stop (for Stop)/ persisting with (for Not Start) task 1 (“Not at 
all difficult” [0] – “Very difficult” [100];) 
• How stressful was it to stop (for Stop)/ persisting with (for Not Start) task 1 (“Not at 
all stressful” [0] – “Very stressful” [100];) 
• How frustrating was it to stop (for Stop)/ persisting with (for Not Start) task 1 (“Not 
at all frustrating” [0] – “Very frustrating” [100];) 
• How difficult was it at the beginning of task 2 (“Not at all difficult” [0] – “Very 
difficult” [100]) 
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• How stressful was it at the beginning of task 2 (“Not at all stressful frustrating” [0] – 
“Very stressful” [100]) 
• How frustrating was it at the beginning of task 2 (“Not at all frustrating” [0] – “Very 
frustrating” [100]) 
• The Positive Affect/Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS) (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 
1988). 
• The eight-item self-efficacy scale (Chen, Gully, & Eden, 2001). 
• Participant’s perceived performance on the two tasks compared to other participants 
(“Very poor” [0] – “Very good” [100]);  
• Knowledge of purpose of study: what they think the pass-mark in the mathematics 
task was; and what they think the purpose of the study was. Participants were asked 
to type out the pass-mark, and were asked to write down what they thought the 
purpose of the study. Only one participant in the final valid sample (see section 5.4.1) 
believed the pass-mark to be zero, and the inclusion of this data-point did not 
impact upon the direction or significance of the results. 
The PANAS (Watson et al., 1988) was included to measure participants’ affective 
states after they have completed their manipulation. In study 1, it was demonstrated 
that the results found had nothing to do with different mood states experienced by 
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participants across the two conditions via the BMIS. This is consistent with previous 
self-regulation studies (e.g., Baumeister et al., 1998; Vohs & Heatherton, 2000). The 
PANAS was included to confirm this finding by using a different mood measure. The 
20-item PANAS loads into two distinct factors, reflected in a single score for Positive-
Affect (PA) and Negative-Affect (NA). It is expected that neither score would differ 
across any of the experimental groups. 
The eight-item self-efficacy scale (Chen et al., 2001) was included to ensure that 
participants’ self-efficacy level did not affect the results. Past research on the link 
between self-efficacy and self-regulatory depletion had produced mixed results. Some 
studies suggested that self-regulatory failure following prior exertion may have 
resulted from reduced self-efficacy following the exertion (Muraven & Baumeister, 
2000); however this finding had been questioned by subsequent studies showing that 
“necessary mediators to self-efficacy” (namely mood, frustration and unpleasantness) 
did not correlate with self-control performance (Muraven & Slessareva, 2003). In 
addition, other studies found that even a successful act of prior self-regulation impedes 
subsequent self-regulatory exertions (e.g., Baumeister et al., 1998; Vohs & Heatherton, 
2000). This result further questions the efficacy-depletion link, since if even successful 
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self-regulation leads depletion, it seems unlike that depletion could have been caused 
by decreased self-efficacy. 
After participants completed the questions, they were fully debriefed, thanked, 
and dismissed. (See appendix C for the participant debrief forms.) 
5.4 Analyses and Results 
5.4.1 Final data and manipulation checks. 
The final sample consisted of 83 datapoints, after removing the data of 11 
participants who failed to make any responses in the dependent measure, and an 
additional 30 whose relative ratings for the two tasks were opposite to what was 
intended. As stated in section 5.4.1 above, even though participants generally rated the 
trivia quiz more favourably than the mathematics task (which is the intended direction), 
30 participants made the opposite rating individually. Effectively, these 30 participants 
were using the reverse self-regulatory strategies as intended: those in Not Start (i.e., 
completing the mathematics task first) would be self-regulating by stopping their 
preferred mathematics task on-time; whereas those in Stop (i.e., completing the trivia 
quiz first) would be self-regulating by not starting their more-preferred mathematics 
task before the agreed time. The presence of these participants could have weakened 
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the overall effectiveness of the two Regulatory Strategy conditions, because these 
participants’ regulatory strategies would have been in reverse to the intended strategy 
in each condition. 
The results of the manipulation checks are listed below. 
Relative favourability of the two tasks. Participants showed significantly greater 
preference for the trivia quiz than the mathematics task, as revealed by a paired-
samples t-test (M TRIVIA QUIZ: 65.25; M MATHEMATICS TASK: 43.13; t = 5.76, p < .05). This direction 
was as intended. The relative favourability of the two tasks (i.e., difference between 
each participant’s rating of the trivia and mathematics tasks) did not significantly differ 
across any of the experimental conditions (M STOP: 35.92, M NOT START: 44.75, M NEAR: 42.97, 
M FAR: 38.30, M STOP/NEAR: 33.63, M STOP/FAR: 37.90, M NOT START/NEAR: 51.43, M NOT START/FAR: 38.65; 
SD STOP: 27.74, SD NOT START: 29.34, SD NEAR: 30.10, SD FAR: 27.66, SD STOP/NEAR: 28.64, SD 
STOP/FAR: 27.44, SD NOT START/NEAR: 29.50, SD NOT START/FAR: 28.45; F(1, 78) REGULATORY STRATEGY = 2.18, 
p = .14, F(1, 78) PSYCHOLOGICAL DISTANCE = .46, p = .50, F(1, 78) REGULATORY STRATEGY x PSYCHOLOGICAL 
DISTANCE = 1.84, p = .18). 
Difficulty, frustration and stress felt. Separate 2 (Regulatory Strategy: Stop vs. Not 
Start) x 2 (Psychological Distance: Near vs. Far) ANOVAs were performed on 
participants’ ratings of the difficulty, frustration and stress levels relating to the 
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manipulation, at the end of task 1 (e.g., “how difficult was it to stop (Stop)/persist with 
(Not Start) [name of task 1]?”) None of the differences were significant except for: 
• Frustration of the manipulation: Not Start participants found the manipulation 
significantly more frustrating than Stop (M STOP: 11.18, M NOT START: 23.64, SD STOP: 
21.31, SD NOT START: 34.09, F(1, 78) = 8.79, p < .05). Likewise, Near participants found 
the manipulation significantly more frustrating than Far (M NEAR: 26.00, M FAR: 
10.14, SD NEAR: 34.90, SD FAR: 20.54, F(1, 78) = 8.79, p < .05). The Regulatory Strategy 
and Psychological Distance factors also significantly interacted on this measure 
(M STOP/NEAR: 0.00, M STOP/FAR: 21.80, M NOT START/NEAR: 49.52, M NOT START/FAR: 0.00, SD 
STOP/NEAR: 0.00, SD STOP/FAR: 25.78, SD NOT START/NEAR: 33.94, SD NOT START/FAR: 0.00, F(1, 78) 
= 58.17, p < .05). This result was not expected as there is little a priori reason to 
speculate that any of the experimental groups would find regulation frustrating. 
In any case, this result did not significantly contribute to the overall regression 
model. 
• Stressfulness of the manipulation: Not Start participants found the manipulation 
significantly more stressful than Stop participants (M STOP: 33.97, M NOT START: 46.84, 
SD STOP: 28.11, SD NOT START: 27.47, F(1, 78) = 4.23, p = .04). This result was not 
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expected, especially when compared to study 1 (where it was found that Stop 
participants found the manipulation more stressful). 
In spite of these differences, neither stress nor frustration levels of the 
manipulation produced significant results when added to the regression model, and 
hence were dropped from the final analysis. 
Affect. The 20-item PANAS (Watson et al., 1988) was used to examine whether 
the experimental groups differed in their self-reported affective ratings immediately 
after the experimental manipulation. No significant differences were found in positive 
affect (M STOP: 27.15, M NOT START: 29.16, M NEAR: 28.03, M FAR: 28.40, M STOP/NEAR: 27.53, M 
STOP/FAR: 26.80, M NOT START/NEAR: 28.48, M NOT START/FAR: 29.78, SD STOP: 8.98, SD NOT START: 8.90, 
SD NEAR: 8.46, SD FAR: 9.46, SD STOP/NEAR: 7.72, SD STOP/FAR: 10.23, SD NOT START/NEAR: 9.25, SD NOT 
START/FAR: 8.72, F REGULATORY STRATEGY (1, 78) = .98, p = .33; F PSYCHOLOGICAL DISTANCE (1, 78) = .02, p 
= .88; F REGULATORY STRATEGY x PSYCHOLOGICAL DISTANCE  (1, 78) = .26, p = .61) or negative affect (M 
STOP: 17.95, M NOT START: 16.36, M NEAR: 16.73, M FAR: 17.47, M STOP/NEAR: 18.16, M STOP/FAR: 17.75, 
M NOT START/NEAR: 15.43, M NOT START/FAR: 17.22, SD STOP: 6.70, SD NOT START: 6.45, SD NEAR: 5.69, 
SD FAR: 7.36, SD STOP/NEAR: 5.69, SD STOP/FAR: 7.68, SD NOT START/NEAR: 5.50, SD NOT START/FAR: 7.23, 
F REGULATORY STRATEGY (1, 78) = 1.26, p = .27; F PSYCHOLOGICAL DISTANCE (1, 83) = .23, p = .64; F 
71 
 
 
 
REGULATORY STRATEGY x PSYCHOLOGICAL DISTANCE  (1, 78) = .57, p = .45) scores, confirming the study 1 
finding that the mood state did not have an effect on the main dependent measure.  
Self-Efficacy. The eight-item self-efficacy scale (Chen et al., 2001) was used to 
determine whether the manipulations differentially affected self-efficacy. Consistent 
with previous findings (Muraven & Slessareva, 2003), no significant differences were 
found (M STOP: 67.39, M NOT START: 65.32, M NEAR: 65.92, M FAR: 66.65, M STOP/NEAR: 70.27, M 
STOP/FAR: 64.66, M NOT START/NEAR: 61.98, M NOT START/FAR: 68.38, SD STOP: 18.37, SD NOT START: 24.07, 
SD NEAR: 23.48, SD FAR: 20.77, SD STOP/NEAR: 18.00, SD STOP/FAR: 18.76, SD NOT START/NEAR: 27.37, 
SD NOT START/FAR: 20.77, F REGULATORY STRATEGY (1, 78) = .23, p = .63 F PSYCHOLOGICAL DISTANCE (1, 78) 
= .01, p = .94; F REGULATORY STRATEGY x PSYCHOLOGICAL DISTANCE  (1, 78) = 1.59, p = .21). 
Perceived performance. None of the experimental conditions showed any 
significant differences in their self-appraisal of their performance on either the trivia or 
maths task (Perceived trivia performance: M STOP: 46.18, M NOT START: 47.86, M NEAR: 47.43, 
M FAR: 46.74, M STOP/NEAR: 45.53, M STOP/FAR: 46.80, M NOT START/NEAR: 49.14, M NOT START/FAR: 46.70, 
SD STOP: 20.52, SD NOT START: 25.21, SD NEAR: 23.20, SD FAR: 23.08, SD STOP/NEAR: 20.70, SD 
STOP/FAR: 20.87, SD NOT START/NEAR: 26.65, SD NOT START/FAR: 25.32, F REGULATORY STRATEGY (1, 78) = .12, 
p = .73 F PSYCHOLOGICAL DISTANCE (1, 78) = .01, p = .91; F REGULATORY STRATEGY x PSYCHOLOGICAL DISTANCE  
(1, 78) = .13, p = .72; perceived maths performance: M STOP: 45.51, M NOT START: 42.14, M NEAR: 
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44.38, M FAR: 43.12, M STOP/NEAR: 49.11, M STOP/FAR: 42.10, M NOT START/NEAR: 40.10, M NOT START/FAR: 
44.00, SD STOP: 28.47, SD NOT START: 28.39, SD NEAR: 30.74, SD FAR: 26.20, SD STOP/NEAR: 34.23, 
SD STOP/FAR: 22.06, SD NOT START/NEAR: 27.34, SD NOT START/FAR: 29.81, F REGULATORY STRATEGY (1, 78) 
= .32, p = .57; F PSYCHOLOGICAL DISTANCE (1, 78) = .06, p = .81; F REGULATORY STRATEGY x PSYCHOLOGICAL 
DISTANCE  (1, 78) = .75, p = .39). 
5.4.2 Results. 
Table 5-1 below summarises the results. The main dependent variable is the 
mean depletion score, operationalised by the number of words correctly identified in 
the dichotic listening task. Lower score on this measure indicating greater depletion. 
Regulatory 
strategy 
Psychological 
distance 
Mean 
depletion 
score 
Standard 
deviation 
N 
Stop 
Near 32.16 9.09 19 
Far 28.50 8.72 20 
Total 30.28 8.98 39 
Not Start 
Near 29.57 8.11 21 
Far 33.26 9.22 23 
Total 31.50 8.81 44 
Total 
Near 30.80 8.58 40 
Far 31.05 9.20 43 
Total 30.93 8.85 83 
73 
 
 
 
Table 5-1: Descriptive statistics of the dependent measure in study 2, after the data of 30 participants 
who preferred the mathematics task to the trivia quiz were removed.  
A 2 (Regulatory Strategy: Stop vs. Not Start) x 2 (Psychological Distance: Near vs. 
Far) ANOVA was conducted with task 1 completion time as a covariate. Task 1 
completion time indicates the number of second participants spent on the first task. This 
is similar to the covariate used in study 1 (task 1 overtime) in order to hold constant the 
variability in the time spent on task 1 across the conditions. Since participants were not 
given an opportunity to nominate the number of minutes they intended to spend on 
task 1, but rather being advised to spend ten minutes on each task, a “task 1 overtime” 
measure here would simply be a linear transformation of “task 1 time” (i.e. one may 
obtain “task 1 overtime” by subtracting ten minutes from “task 1 time”.) 
Unlike study 1, the amount of time spent on task 1 in the four experimental 
conditions did not significantly differ, as revealed by an ANOVA with task 1 
completion time as the dependent measure (F REGULATORY STRATEGY (1, 78) = 2.64, p = .11; F 
PSYCHOLOGICAL DISTANCE (1, 78) = .12, p = .73; F REGULATORY STRATEGY x PSYCHOLOGICAL DISTANCE (1, 78) 
= .64, p = .43). Nevertheless, this measure of task 1 completion time was retained in this 
analysis in order to maintain consistency with the analysis of study 1. 
Regulatory 
strategy 
Psychological 
distance 
Task 1 
completion 
time 
Standard 
deviation 
N 
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(seconds) 
Stop 
Near 636.78 211.14 19 
Far 555.63 241.70 20 
Total 595.16 228.07 39 
Not Start 
Near 695.38 273.86 21 
Far 727.73 467.79 23 
Total 712.29 383.55 44 
Total 
Near 667.54 244.78 40 
Far 647.69 467.79 43 
Total 657.25 323.58 83 
Table 5-2: Descriptive statistics of task 1 completion time in study 2, after the data of 30 participants 
who preferred the mathematics task to the trivia quiz were removed.  
The ANOVA revealed non-significant main effects for Regulatory Strategy and 
Psychological Distance (F (1, 78) = .79, p = .38; and F (1, 78) = .00, p = .95, respectively.) 
The mean depletion scores for each condition are shown in Figure 5-1 below. 
Additionally, the effect of task 1 completion time had no significant effect on the overall 
ANOVA model (F TASK 1 COMPLETION TIME (1, 78) = 3.35, p = .07), suggesting that the amount 
of time spent on task 1 by participants did not affect the overall result. This result was 
similar to that found in study 1. The interaction between Regulatory Strategy and 
Psychological Distance was significant (F (1, 78) = 4.33, p < .05). See Figure 5-1 for an 
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illustration of the interaction, and please see appendix A for outputs from the SPSS 
analysis. 
 
Figure 5-1: Graphical representation of mean depletion scores in the four experimental conditions in 
study 2. 
Further analyses revealed that the only significant simple effect was that Stop 
was significantly more depleting than Not Start in the Far Psychological Distance 
condition only (F(1, 78) = 4.47, p < .05). The result shows that it was the inherent 
“nearness” of the tempting activity in the Stop condition and the distance of the 
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tempting activity in the Not Start condition in Study 1 that drove the results. Therefore, 
the request of Thaler’s (1983) economists to have the cashews removed from the table 
makes sense. When Psychological Distance was Near, Not Start was no longer less 
depleting than Stop, thus the results seen in study 1 disappeared (F REGULATORY STRATEGY IN 
PSYCHOLOGICAL DISTANCE (NEAR) (1, 78) = 0.67, p = .41). This suggests that when the more-
favoured task was made psychologically proximal during self-regulation, the two self-
regulatory strategies were equally depleting. 
This result is contrary to an intuitive possibility: that the two Stop conditions and 
Not Start/Near would be equally depleting, and all three would be more depleting than 
Not Start/Far. That is because the more-preferred task is more proximal to perceivers in 
both Stop, and the Not Start/Near, conditions, compared to Not Start/Far. The proximity 
of this more-preferred task in these conditions may increase their self-regulatory 
demands. Whilst this intuition is acknowledged, the emerged result can also be 
explained this way: Stop/Far is more depleting than Stop/Near because participants in 
the former can engage in the more-preferred task without any reminder of the less-
preferred task, unlike the latter. Stop/Far should also be more depleting than both Not 
Start conditions because Not Start participants were not immediately engaging in the 
more-preferred task. There is no a priori basis to predict the relative depletion patterns 
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of Stop/Near and the two Not Start conditions, so presumably they are equally depleting. 
Neverteless, it is acknowledged that the relatively impurity of the data (due to the 
number of datapoints being excluded) may have played a role in this intuitive result not 
being obtained. Future studies should attempt to rectify the impurities and ensure that 
the two tasks are designed in such a way to maximise differences in participant 
preferences for each task. 
5.5 Discussion 
The main objective of study 2 was to address a potential confound in the design 
of study 1, by controlling for the psychological distance between participants and the 
more-favoured task. The main effect found in study 1 (Stop being more depleting than 
Not Start) was no longer significant in study 2. More importantly, the interaction 
between Regulatory Strategy and Psychological Distance was significant. The results 
supported the suggestion made in section 3.5 that Stop could have been more depleting 
because the more-favoured task was in the participant’s immediately experience, 
whereas for Not Start, the more-favoured task was only available in anticipation.  
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6 GENERAL DISCUSSION 
6.1 Explicating boundary conditions of the principle of Diminishing Marginal Utility 
The central research question here was to examine the relative difficulty of two 
self-regulatory strategies: to stop an already-commenced consumption episode, or to 
not start it in the first place. Thaler (1983) suggested that once a consumer begins 
consumption, there are circumstances where the probability of them being able to stop 
at an appropriate level is very low – even nonexistent, even though consumers often 
believe otherwise. This suggestion, however, is inconsistent with DMU and 
conventional economic theories, which would predict that not starting a consumption 
episode would be more difficult than stopping one, because the utility that the 
consumer experiences is highest for the first unit consumed; and utility deceases as each 
additional unit is consumed. Therefore, stopping should become increasingly less 
difficult. Study 1 lent tentative support for Thaler’s contention. It was identified, 
however, that when participants engaged in self-regulation during task 1, the more-
favoured task was always immediately available to Stop participants, but not to Not 
Start participants. This systematic discrepancy could have confounded the study’s 
results. Study 2 addressed this issue by experimentally manipulating the physical 
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distance of the regulatory act. It was found that Stop was no longer more depleting than 
Not Start when the more-favoured task was made available to the conscious perception 
of Not Start participants. 
Study 1 results confirmed what Thaler’s (1983) Mirage had speculated: that once 
consumption started, it was difficult to stop consuming. Thaler’s prediction was 
inconsistent with that made by DMU. DMU is a robust economic principle; however its 
descriptive validity has been increasingly scrutinised by emerging literature (e.g. Rabin, 
2000a; Rabin, 2000b; Rabin & Thaler, 2001), as DMU makes predictions that are at odds 
with a number of real-world phenomena, such as predicting extreme and implausible 
levels of risk aversion (Rabin & Thaler, 2001) (please refer to section 2.1.2 for more 
details). The findings from the current research add to this literature by empirically 
confirming a boundary condition of the DMU’s predictive effectiveness. 
Study 1’s finding, however, does not mean Stop is always more difficult to attain 
than Not Start. As stated in section 2 above, it is sometimes possible for consumers to 
stop their consumption at the appropriate time. If Stop were entirely impossible then the 
whole question over the relative merits of Stop and Not Start would be rendered 
irrelevant, because consumers would simply never contemplate Stop as a possibility. 
Thaler’s (1983) Mirage and past research had not explicitly examined circumstances 
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under which Not Start could be as difficult to achieve as Stop. Study 2 empirically 
demonstrated a boundary condition to Thaler’s prediction: namely, reducing the 
psychological distance of the rewarding event can hamper an individual’s efforts to not 
start consuming, to the extent where their effort would be just as depleting as if they 
were self-regulating by stopping. 
 
6.2 Boundary conditions on the strength model of self-regulatory resource depletion 
The current research also adds to existing literature by explicating a boundary 
condition of the strength model of self-regulatory resource depletion. The strength 
model stated that, once an individual engages in a self-regulatory episode, their 
subsequent ability to self-regulate would become temporarily depleted (e.g., Baumeister 
et al., 1998; Baumeister & Heatherton, 1996; Muraven & Baumeister, 2000). The existing 
literature on strength model, however, is yet to examine in detail the circumstances 
under which depletion may be exacerbated or attenuated. Existing findings assert that 
once an individual engages in a self-regulatory endeavour, their subsequent ability to 
self-regulate would be somewhat adversely affected. Recent research has begun to 
explore some of those boundary conditions. For example, it had been found that if the 
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two self-regulatory acts were of similar “control processes”, rather than being irrelevant 
to each other, prior self-regulation would actually enhance, rather than hamper, 
subsequent self-regulation (Dewitte et al., 2009) (see also section 2.3). Specifically, it was 
found that individuals who were asked to self-regulate by resisting food intake showed 
better subsequent performance at another food-resistance task (similar control 
processes), but suffered from depletion if they were subsequently asked to complete an 
anagram task (dissimilar control processes) (Dewitte et al., 2009, Study 2). The current 
research adds to this emerging literature by examining how two self-regulatory 
strategies could have different implications on individuals’ subsequent ability to self-
regulate. Specifically, both strategies under investigation, Stop and Not Start, were acts 
of self-regulation, in that they both required an individual to actively override their 
dominant response (i.e., to continue consuming in Stop; and to begin consuming in Not 
Start, respectively) (Baumeister & Heatherton, 1996). The strength model, in its present 
form, would have only predicted that both strategies would lead to some subsequent 
depletion, without being able to explicate the two strategies’ relative effectiveness to 
each other. Findings from the current research empirically addressed this question: 
ordinarily, Stop leads to greater depletion than Not Start.  
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Furthermore, the present research empirically examined a possible mechanism 
which underlies self-regulatory resource depletion, namely the psychological distance 
of the stimulus that consumers regulate against. Specifically, whilst it was 
demonstrated that Stop is generally more difficult to achieve than Not Start, this 
difference is attenuated by manipulating the psychological distance that is perceived by 
the consumer from the anticipated activity (i.e. the less-favoured activity in Stop, and 
the more-favoured activity in Not Start, respectively). This result means that altering the 
psychological distance of an upcoming event can affect one’s self-regulatory depletion 
rate. The role of psychological distance had been linked to self-regulation performance 
in past research, however the process by which psychological distance affects self-
control had not been explicated, nor has the strength model examined the implication of 
psychological distance on depletion. Some of the relevant existing research is discussed 
below. 
A number of early papers had speculated on how individuals may change their 
preferences in favour of an immediately gratifying event as that event draws near, 
which (if infringes against their long-term wellbeing) may invoke the need for self-
regulation (e.g., Ainslie, 1975; Strotz, 1955). An extensive field of further research had 
examined how the perceived value of outcomes could be manipulated depending on 
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the psychological distance perspectives adopted by the perceiver (e.g., Bar-Anan et al., 
2006; Loewenstein, 1988; Trope et al., 2007). Those existing studies did not directly 
address the question of how the perceived psychological distance of an event impinges 
upon self-regulation against it. Results from those studies could be invoked to infer that 
more self-control is required for an immediately available outcome, based on the 
assumption that people tend to change their preference in favour of immediate 
gratification (O'Donoghue & Rabin, 1999).  
One of the first attempts to directly test the role of psychological distance on self-
control came about in the delay of gratification literature. Those studies generally 
attempted to explicate circumstances under which people (especially children) would 
choose a small-yet-immediate reward over a large-yet-delayed reward (Metcalfe & 
Mischel, 1999; Mischel, Ayduk, & Mendoza-Denton, 2003; Mischel & Metzner, 1962). 
One of the circumstances tested was whether reducing the physical proximity of either 
the delayed or the immediate reward would impinge upon delay behaviour (Mischel & 
Ebbesen, 1970). It was found that when the delayed (and greater) reward was made 
immediately visible, individuals became less inclined to choose that delayed reward. In 
other words, Mischel and Ebbesen’s finding linked the reduction of psychological 
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distance of an anticipated event to reduced ability to self-regulate (in the form of 
delaying behaviour).  
The strength model of self-regulatory resource depletion, in its current form, is 
yet to deal with the implication of psychological distance. As previously discussed, the 
strength model would have assumed that an act of prior self-regulation would 
adversely affect subsequent self-regulatory acts. There is no discussion yet on the 
potential role played by psychological distance, despite the link found by Mischel and 
Ebbesen (1970). The present research further added to the strength model literature by 
exploring the psychological distance of an anticipated event as a boundary condition to 
self-regulatory depletion. Specifically, in study 2, it was found that reducing the 
psychological distance of the anticipated task 2 (less-favoured task in Stop, and more –
favoured task in Not Start) attenuated the advantage held by Not Start over Stop, in that 
both strategies became equally depleting. This result would have been predicted by 
delay of gratification studies (Mischel & Ebbesen, 1970), but the present research 
represents the first empirical confirmation of this boundary condition for the strength 
model. 
Finally, as stated in section 2.3 earlier, studies used in the strength model 
literature had yet to examine the depletion implication of ceasing an already-
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commenced consumption episode. Most of the studies used to examine depletion were 
of a not-start nature; that is, resisting from some kind of consumption or activity (e.g., 
food, mood, thought suppression). Critics argued that should self-regulation be defined 
as an act of active overriding of self, then the strength model should also examine self-
regulation by action rather than resistance (Carver & Scheier, 1996). The present study 
established that the Stop strategy is at least as depleting as the standard Not Start 
strategy used in typical strength model studies. This demonstration establishes an 
impetus for further investigations into how other self-regulatory strategies may 
differentially affect depletion patterns, further contributing towards the strength model 
literature. 
6.3 Other Contributions 
In addition to the discussion above, the current research contributed to the 
literature and provides opportunities for future research in several other domains. They 
are classified as follows and will be expanded below: 
1. Implication of the perceived psychological distance of events on self-regulation, 
and ultimately on the self’s executive function; 
2. Implication towards studying the multidimensionality of psychological distance. 
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6.3.1 Potential effect of psychological distance on the self’s executive function. 
The present research has also established a foundation towards better 
understanding how psychological distance of stimuli in the environment affects 
people’s executive functioning. As discussed in section 4.1 above, Lewin (1951) 
contended that individuals’ behaviour at any given moment is governed by the wide 
range of stimuli in their environment, and that the “distance” of those stimuli affects 
how much impact they impose on behaviour; however there is no precise specification 
on how this occurs. The present research showed the manner in which the perceived 
psychological distance of an anticipated event affects self-regulatory efficacy against 
that event. In other words, psychological distance affects self-regulation. As stated 
earlier, even though the strength model was originally devised to examine the 
implications of self-regulatory exertions, subsequent studies have found that self-
regulation draws upon the same psychic strength as other executive functions (Vohs, 
Baumeister, Schmeichel, Twenge, & Nelson, 2008). The implication here is that if an 
activity is shown to deplete one’s self-regulatory resource, then it is also likely to impair 
other domains of executive functions. 
Executive functioning covers many facets, such as the ability to actively engage 
in choices, decision-making, and active volitions (Vohs et al., 2008). These abilities 
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contribute to the uniqueness and complexity of human life. Even though human 
behaviour is governed by automatic processes most of the time (Bargh, 2002), the 
occasional moments when people have to exercise their volition and make active 
choices become a crucial feature of human functioning (Baumeister et al., 1998). The 
increasingly complex nature of human life means that the number of stimuli in people’s 
environment and the number of choices they face daily are both continually multiplied 
(Schwartz, 2000). Even though having no choices is clearly not ideal and traditionally 
seen as suboptimal (Thaler, 1983), consumer research literature had reported that 
excessive amount of choices could bring about negative feelings (Mick, 2005).  
Given the importance of volitional choices in daily functioning, there is a case to 
further examine factors that affect people’s ability to carry out those choices in a way 
that best serves their long-term well-being. It appears that the psychological distance of 
stimuli in the environment would be an important determinant towards this ability. The 
current investigation has made this linkage. 
6.3.2 Implications toward a multi-dimensional view of psychological distance. 
As discussed earlier, it was suggested that psychological distance can be 
manipulated along a number of different sensory dimensions, including spatial, 
temporal, social, and hypotheticality (Bar-Anan et al., 2006). Trope et al (2007) suggest 
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that the various dimensions of psychological distance are interrelated.  An implication 
of this assertion is that if an event is moved along one dimension, the effect of that 
manipulation can be reversed by moving the same event in the opposite direction along 
another dimension. This implication is yet to be directly tested, however, with past 
empirical studies involving manipulation of only one psychological distance dimension 
at a time. For example, delay of gratification studies manipulated the physical 
dimension of an outcome and how that affects people’s ability to delay a greater reward 
(e.g., Mischel & Ebbesen, 1970); whilst various studies examining how events were 
viewed and construed according to how the event is framed along a temporal 
dimension (e.g., Trope & Liberman, 2003). 
The present research (specifically study 2) contributed to the literature by 
showing that psychological distance dimensions can be interrelated. This was 
accomplished by observing the behavioural consequences of manipulating two 
psychological distance dimensions concurrently. Specifically, study 2 tested whether it 
was possible to reverse the effect of moving an event along one dimension, by moving 
that same event along another dimension in the opposite direction. This was 
operationalised by introducing the Psychological Distance factor, containing the Near 
(where the anticipated task 2 was made visible during the first task) and Far (where the 
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anticipated task 2 was not made visible to subjects during the first task) conditions. The 
effect of the new Near condition is to reduce the physical distance of the second task, 
which in the Far condition and in study 1 were temporally distant. If the 
interrelatedness assertion of psychological distance dimensions were correct, then the 
effect of increased temporal distance seen in study 1 should be reduced by decreased 
physical distance used by the Near condition of study 2. Indeed this result was found: in 
the Near Psychological Distance condition, the two self-regulatory strategies were as 
depleting as each other. The implication here is that the depleting effect of the temporal 
distance was being reversed by reducing the same event’s physical distance. Previous 
studies in psychological distance have not examined how the effect of moving a 
stimulus along one dimension can be reversed by moving the same stimulus along 
another dimension in the opposite direction.  
It is hoped that the present research has provided the impetus to more precisely 
determine the consequences of concurrently manipulating multiple psychological 
distance dimensions. For instance, would the study 2 finding (i.e., in Stop, reducing the 
physical distance of the regulatory act made the condition as depleting as Not Start) 
hold if participants were required to resist from the tempting stimulus for not ten 
minutes, but for one hour? How could social distance and hypotheticality of situations 
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(the other two forms of psychological distance proposed by Trope et al. (2007)) affect 
self-regulatory depletion? Previous studies have demonstrated that social exclusion can 
have a deleterious effect on self-regulation (Baumeister et al., 2005) such as increased 
propensity to engage in aggressive behaviour (Twenge et al., 2001); could the adverse 
consequences of increased social distance be compensated by reduced distance from 
another dimension? The studies presented here provide a platform to examine these 
questions. 
7 FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
The present research was limited in its ability to examine a wider scope of 
theoretical issues relating to self-regulation and psychological distance. Several ways to 
further explicate the effects of psychological distance on self-regulatory resource 
depletion were offered in section 6 above. The methodology used in the current studies 
can also be extended to encompass a wider range of self-regulatory phenomena. A 
number of proposed research projects are presented below that may bring further 
contribution to literature. 
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7.1 Research proposal 1: Regulating against an active action versus against a passive 
inaction? 
In both studies 1 and 2, participants were offered a choice of two tasks that 
differed in desirability. Each task, be it a trivia quiz, mathematical task or Sudoku 
puzzle, requires some degree of active engagement. In reality, however, self-regulation 
does not always involve choosing between two tasks that both require such active 
engagement. Self-regulation often involves choosing between some sort of activity and 
mere passive inaction. For example, a research student may have to choose between 
resting idly or work on a research paper (assuming that the research paper is not 
immediately more desirable than resting, but is ultimately beneficial to the career of the 
student). This strategy is similar to Stop, but instead of ending an activity that is 
immediately desirable, the person ends a period of inactivity, and moves onto an 
activity that is not immediately appealing but is ultimately beneficial. This strategy 
could be called Start. Conversely, the same research student may have to choose 
between continuing to work on a research paper and stop working and start 
daydreaming. This kind of self-regulation is similar to Not Start, but instead of resisting 
from starting a desirable activity, the person is resisting from ending a less-than-
desirable but ultimately beneficial activity. This strategy could be called Not Stop. 
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In the above examples, note that the immediately desirable alternative to writing 
the research paper (i.e., resting idly) is one that does not require much active 
engagement. This is in contrast to the two studies conducted in the current research, 
where each of Stop and Not Start involved two separate tasks which both require actual 
activity. If the relative efficacy of the two new strategies introduced here were to be 
compared, it would be hypothesised that Not Stop is more depleting than Start. This is 
because when one uses the Not Stop strategy, they are moving from a position of active 
action to one of passive inaction. It had been found that volitional actions draws upon 
the same psychic resource as that required in self-regulatory acts (Vohs et al., 2008). In 
other words, deploying the Not Stop strategy would result in resource depletion via two 
channels: the self-regulatory act of resisting from stopping what they were doing, and 
the active volition required to continue their present course of action. In contrast, the 
Start strategy involves moving from a position of idleness to one of action. Prior to the 
switch into action, the regulator is not required to exercise any active volition. Therefore 
there is only one way by which the regulator’s self-regulatory resource is consumed: via 
the act of switching to action itself. 
Having said that, it is not immediately clear that the two concurrent acts of self-
regulation required in Not Stop does indeed lead to more depletion, compared to the 
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single act of self-regulation required in Start. Existing strength model literature has yet 
to answer the question of whether the rate of subsequent depletion is proportional to 
the number of concurrent multiple self-regulatory acts being committed beforehand. 
This proposed study may not offer an answer immediately, but its results may 
stimulate further research to shed light on the nature of self-regulatory depletion. 
As outlined at the beginning of the section, Stop and Not Start are self-regulatory 
strategies that each requires two actions; whereas Start and Not Stop are ones that 
require only one action (and passive inaction). It is also possible to compare the efficacy 
of Stop and Not Start against Start and Not Stop, which poses the question: is it more 
difficult to self-regulate when one has to choose between two actions, or to choose 
between action and mere idleness? This has implications towards whether resistance 
against undesirable impulses can be enhanced by making alternative activities available 
to the regulator. For instance, if it is found that strategies that have an alternative 
activity (Stop and Not Start) are less depleting, then it can be suggested that one can 
improve their chances of succeeding in self-regulation by engaging in an alternative 
activity. 
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7.2 Research proposal 2: can the knowledge of harsher penalties against self-
regulatory failure reduce self-regulatory resource depletion?  
The performance of actions to override an impulse is not the only component 
towards self-regulation. Effective self-regulation has at least three ingredients: the 
existence of standards to which the regulator must adhere; monitoring mechanism to 
detect deviation from those standards; and an operate phase which acts to rectify that 
deviation (Baumeister & Heatherton, 1996; Carver & Scheier, 1982). Devising and 
executing strategies like those used in this study is only part of the “operate” phase of 
self-regulation; other successful strategies may target the standard and monitoring 
phases. Several possible studies are proposed whereby the effectiveness of altering the 
standards and monitoring phases of self-regulation can be determined by assessing the 
degree of self-regulatory resource depletion that takes place. 
One of the propositions relate to an alternative strategy to “stop”: altering the 
consequences associated with overriding a pre-set preference in favour of a future 
preference (Thaler & Shefrin, 1981). For instance, a dieter may explicitly record their 
dietary intake which “seems to act as a tax on any behavior [sic] which [the individual] 
views as deviant” (p. 397); or an alcoholic may ingest the drug Antabuse which induces 
illness if they consumes alcohol. The tactic of actively monitoring one’s consumption is 
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commonly used in credit and diet clinic settings (as observed by Thaler and Shefrin). 
This tactic still allows the individual to change their preference (so is distinct from a 
“not start” strategy, because Not Start precludes the regulator to deviate from their 
original plan;) however it requires establishing measures to ensure that if the individual 
deviates from his or her original plans, there would be additional adverse consequences 
(above and beyond just the loss of long-term well-being as a result from this deviation; 
for instance, ingesting Antabuse makes the person vomit, thus providing for an 
immediately adverse consequence as well as the long-term health effects of alcoholism). 
The existence of this immediately adverse consequence should increase the likelihood 
of the regulator monitoring their own behaviour in order to avoid that consequence. 
Therefore, it is tentatively hypothesised that if the regulator is made aware of the gap 
between their current and desired states, he would suffer from less depletion when he is 
required to self-regulate, compared to another regulator who has no such augmented 
monitoring mechanism.  
The standard of regulation can be manipulated by changing the severity level of 
the self-regulatory demand. For example, when a regulator attempts the “not start” 
strategy, she has several options regarding how strong the regulatory standard is: total 
refusal against any level of consumption (of the particular stimulus in question) is the 
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strongest form (Strotz, 1955); however less rigid forms of this strategy allows 
individuals to limit the range or class of discretion allowed on the consumption (Thaler 
& Shefrin, 1981). Limitation by range is accomplished by setting a limit on how much 
the regulator may consume the tempting object; whereas limitation by class is 
accomplished by identifying different variations of the tempting object and prohibit 
consumption of one (or some) of those variations. For example, a recovering problem 
gambler may either limit their consumption by setting a rule to carry no more than $20 
in cash (limiting by range, so that the maximum amount this person can gamble is the 
$20 they carry;) or they may choose to avoid electronic gaming machines but impose no 
conditions on other forms of gambling like horse racing and lottery tickets (limiting by 
class, so that this person is only banned from playing gaming machines but not other 
forms of gambling.) 
Thaler and Shefrin (1981) assumed that a strategy of total abstinence is more 
difficult to achieve than less-extreme rules. Their assumption can be tested by 
hypothesising that a regulator who is required to completely precommit against an 
object of temptation will suffer from greater self-regulatory depletion than one who 
limits their consumption by range or class. For example, participants may be shown a 
range of tasty treats; the “total abstinence” group may be asked to not consume any of 
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the treats; the “limit by class” group may be asked to only refrain from eating one type 
of treats (e.g. chocolate, but are free to consume other treats available;) and the “limit by 
range” group may be asked to only consume a set amount of treats (e.g. a maximum of 
two pieces of chocolate, one piece of cake). It is tentatively hypothesised that the “total 
abstinence” group would experience the greatest level of depletion. No a priori 
hypothesis can be offered regarding the relative depletion rates of “limit by range” 
versus “limit by class”, but these two groups are expected to experience less depletion 
than participants who are asked to abstain totally. 
7.3 Research proposal 3: what is fundamental about “tempting” stimuli?  
In the current research, participants in both studies were asked to complete two 
tasks which differed in desirability. The relative preference of the two tasks was 
measured after participants had viewed a sample of each task prior to the 
commencement of the study. There remains a question, however: if an activity is rated 
as more preferable than another available alternative, does it necessarily make it more 
tempting? 
Loewenstein (1996) observed that people often engage in behaviours that do not 
conform to their long-term self-interests, with the full knowledge that their decision is 
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not optimal but feel an experience of being “out of control”. This observation in itself is 
not new, as a large body of literature had already explored the behavioural 
consequences of time-inconsistent preferences in favour of immediately gratification 
(please refer to section 2.) The novel aspect of Loewenstein’s contention is that this kind 
of suboptimal decision-making can be attributed to the operations of “visceral factors”, 
which include drive states such as hunger, pain, sexual desires, emotions, and cravings 
for addictive drugs. Loewenstein (1996) suggested that there are two underlying 
assumptions on how visceral factors operate: firstly, visceral experiences can 
disproportionately influence behaviour to the extent that all other goals are temporarily 
ignored. Secondly, people are likely to underestimate the influence of visceral factors in 
the future or in the past, or those that are experienced by other people. 
In his 1996 paper, Loewenstein suggested that existing literature on decision 
theory had not adequately addressed the kind of “out of control” experience that people 
feel when they succumb to temptations that compromise their ultimate well-being. 
Decision theory, at that point, had viewed momentary conflicts between visceral 
influences and long-term self-interest simply as a matter of competing reasons for 
behaving in different ways (Tversky & Shafir, 1992), and treated all behaviour as 
volitional. Loewenstein questioned this viewpoint. Specifically, Loewenstein stated that 
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when visceral influence is low, people are able to act rationally to satisfy their long-term 
needs (e.g. a slightly-tired driver can act to alleviate their tiredness or refrain from 
driving); whereas when visceral influence is extremely high, people do not perceive 
themselves to be making decisions at all (e.g. a very tired driver may involuntarily fall 
asleep at the wheel.) It is when people are influenced by a moderate level of visceral 
influence that they are most likely engage in what they perceive as “irrational” 
behaviour (e.g. a moderately tired driver choosing to continue to drive to their own 
detriment.) 
If Loewenstein’s (1996) contentions were correct, one would require the highest 
level of self-regulation when the visceral factors involved in the regulatory episode is 
moderately strong. In other words, using the self-regulatory resource depletion 
paradigm, a self-regulatory episode involving moderate levels of visceral influence 
should induce the highest level of resource depletion, compared to situations involving 
very low or very high levels of visceral influence. When visceral level is extremely high, 
people are usually left in a stage where they become incapable to make decisions; 
whereas when visceral level is very low, people can generally continue to act in 
accordance to their long-term goals. 
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Visceral influences can be manipulated. As Loewenstein (1996) stated, visceral 
factors exert disproportionately high influence when it is in the present. It is possible to 
increase the degree of visceral influence by asking individuals to imagine themselves 
being in the midst of a consumption episode. This method was used by Gold (1994), 
who asked participants to recall as vividly as possible an episode of unprotected sexual 
intercourse, and asked participants to nominate the most salient justifications when 
they decided to not use condoms. Then participants were asked to evaluate how 
rational those heat-of-the-moment justifications were in the present. Gold (1994) found 
that this method reduced the subsequent incidence of unprotected sex among the 
participants; however the study’s implication towards the current research is that it is 
possible to enhance the visceral influence of a stimulus, without necessarily subjecting 
individuals to the stimulus. In other words, the strength of the visceral factor can be 
manipulated by asking participants to imagine, as vividly as possible, a consumption 
episode. For example, participants may be asked to resist from chocolate consumption 
in a standard strength model paradigm; the “high visceral influence” group would be 
asked to imagine vividly the colour, aroma and taste of the chocolate; whereas the “low 
visceral influence” group would be asked to simply refrain from eating the chocolate. 
The participants would then be subjected to the depletion measure. It is hypothesised 
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that the high visceral influence group would suffer from greater depletion than the low 
visceral influence group. Note that for ethical reasons, it may not be practicable to 
establish an “extremely high visceral influence” group; however if one does exist, 
depletion in this group would be lower than the high visceral influence group, because 
people would simply not have the capacity to make decision under this kind of extreme 
influence. 
8 CONCLUSIONS 
The main impetus of the present research was to examine Thaler’s “Mirage” 
paradox (1983); specifically, the focus was on the relative efficacies of two self-
regulatory strategies: stopping an already-commenced consumption episode versus not 
starting it at all. It was found that the Stop strategy was more psychologically 
demanding; however the deleterious effect of this strategy could be compensated by 
altering the psychological distance of the impending task that the participants were 
anticipating. 
This research provided important contributions in two ways. Firstly, these 
studies expanded on the strength model of self-regulation, specifically by adding to an 
emerging literature which explores the boundary conditions under which the model 
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operates. Secondly, the current research added to discussion on the circumstances 
under which DMU does not adequately predict optimal behaviour. Both contributions 
are important towards the present paradigm in consumer behaviour research. As 
explained in Section 2.1 above, the dominant research paradigm has shifted away from 
assuming consumers as rational information processors; instead, both the long-term 
rational concerns and short-term emotional factors would require consideration (Hoch 
& Loewenstein, 1991). In order for consumers to protect their overall wellbeing, 
consumers need self- regulation to avoid acting on immediate gratifications that may 
jeopardise their long-term interests (Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999). Further understanding 
of the mechanisms of self-regulation is thus important towards consumer behaviour 
research. Meanwhile, DMU is a robust principle which underlies many economic 
theories; however its descriptive validity has come under scrutiny (e.g. Loewenstein & 
Thaler, 1989). Results from the current research aims to further add to the discussion by 
explicating a particular circumstance under which DMU’s predictions were contrary to 
actual behaviour. 
The present research has potential to act as impetus in both psychology and 
marketing disciplines. The role of visceral factors (Loewenstein, 1996), for instance, 
appears to be central to the phenomenon of impulsive shopping (Rook, 1987; Rook & 
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Fisher, 1995); however the implication of visceral factors on self-regulation has not been 
empirically examined. The current research is aimed at setting the platform for further 
insight into the strategies and behavioural consequences of self-regulation, and how 
this very vital branch of human functioning can be improved. 
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APPENDIX A – SPSS PRINT-OUT OF RESULTS FROM STUDIES 1 AND 2 
(see following pages) 
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APPENDIX B – CONSENT FORM USED IN STUDIES 1 AND 2 
Study 1 
The Problem Solving Study 
 
You are invited to participate in a study about people's problem-solving abilities and 
general knowledge performance, with the opportunity to win a cash prize. You will be 
asked to complete questions on logical reasoning and a wide range of general 
knowledge. 
 
If at any time you feel that you would rather not continue with your participation in the 
study, you are welcome to inform the study administrator and discontinue participation 
in the study. 
 
I have read and thoroughly understand the information above  
 
Name SID Date Signature 
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Study 2 
Truly Trivial – A Study of Trivia Games 
 
We are interested in understanding how people approach trivia questions and games, 
and how their approach is related to solving other types of problems, such as 
mathematics. 
 
You are invited to participate in a study in which you will be asked to participate in a 
trivia quiz, a mathematics quiz, and a few other questionnaires. 
 
If at any time you feel that you would rather not continue with your participation in the 
study, you are welcome to inform the study administrator and discontinue participation 
in the study. 
 
I have read and thoroughly understand the information above  
 
Name SID Date Signature 
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
109 
 
 
 
APPENDIX C – PARTICIPANT DEBRIEF FORMS FOR STUDIES 1 AND 2 
Study 1 
Debrief 
 
The Problem Solving Study 
 
We would like to ask you not to discuss the purpose of this study with your fellow 
students, as knowledge of the true nature of the study might compromise its validity. 
 
Results of the Problem Solving Study prize draw will be available on Blackboard (or 
other appropriate outlet) at the end of the semester.  
 
Every day, people are faced with temptations that seem enjoyable in the immediate 
present, but may compromise their more future goals and aspirations. Self-regulation is often 
required to overcome those temptations to help achieving those long-term goals.  
 
There are two kinds of self-regulatory strategies: ceasing an already-commenced 
tempting activity, or not starting one in the first place. We are interested in finding out the 
relative merits of each type of strategy. 
 
The dependent variables are measured to test the research ideas. In this study, the 
dependent variables are: 
1. The time you spent answering the task which can lead to the prize draw (something fun) 
versus the task which you need to do in order to qualify for the prize draw. 
2. Your performance on the Word-Checking Exercise. 
 
The independent variables are manipulated to test the research hypothesis. In this study 
the independent variable is: 
1. Whether you did the “prize draw” task first, or the “qualifying for prize draw” task first.  
 
If you have any questions, please feel free to ask at any time. 
 
Thanks for your participation. If you have any further questions, please contact: 
Elizabeth Cowley - e.cowley@econ.usyd.edu.au/ 9351-6433 
 
If you have any concerns or complaints about the conduct of a research study can 
contact the Manager for Ethics Administration, University of Sydney on (02) 9351 4811. 
 
Thanks again. 
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Study 2 
Debrief 
 
“Truly Trivial” – A study of trivia games 
 
Every day, people are faced with temptations that seem enjoyable in the immediate 
present, but may compromise their more future goals and aspirations. There are two kinds of 
self-regulatory strategies: ceasing an already-commenced tempting activity, or not starting one 
in the first place. We are interested in finding out which is more demanding on individuals. 
 
The dependent variables are measured to test the research ideas. In this study, the 
dependent variables are: 
3. The time you spent answering the Trivia Challenge (something fun) and the 
Mathematics Quiz (something mundane yet you’re supposed to do). 
4. Your performance on the Listening Exercise. 
 
The independent variables are manipulated to see which one of the two self-regulatory 
strategies is more demanding, and whether the relative psychological distance between the 
Trivia Challenge and the Maths Quiz influenced the way you achieved this self-regulation. In 
this study the independent variables are: 
2. The presentation of the two tasks – whether they were presented simultaneously (low 
psychological distance) or sequentially (high psychological distance). 
3. Whether you worked with the Mathematics Quiz or the Trivia Challenge first.  
 
We would like to ask you not to discuss the purpose of this study with your fellow 
students, as knowledge of the true nature of the study might compromise its validity. 
 
Results of this study and the Trivia Challenge prize draw will be available on 
Blackboard at the end of the semester. If you have any questions – please feel free to ask. 
 
Thanks for your participation. If you have any further questions, please contact: 
Elizabeth Cowley - e.cowley@econ.usyd.edu.au/ 9351-6433 
 
If you have any concerns or complaints about the conduct of a research study can 
contact the Manager for Ethics Administration, University of Sydney on (02) 9351 4811. 
 
 
Thanks again. 
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APPENDIX D – WORDS USED IN THE DICHOTIC LISTENING TASK (STUDY 2) 
The following is a list of words used in the dichotic listening task in Study 2. 
Bold words are the correct solutions. 
the into three might father himself close seemed 
and more must sound night money though kept 
to to does sore to didn't idea notice 
is him even thought being morning lived strong 
that time well few second trees became probably 
he know such always soon body at birds 
was then here show story family grow horse 
are been why often since turn yet sounds 
with who help asked days face less stand 
they people years don't paper cut wind start 
be made away going mere group behind class 
from did off school better half letter slowly 
have only old until across red four river 
by find great form today plants letters common 
had may man keep however wanted able American 
but long small feet means eat shown quickly 
all very found side its united states English find 
when words between boy told kinds perhaps round 
there just should animals miles gave six girls 
and most home enough ways open fire ball 
which get give sometimes whole lines green tried 
said back line head example really built questions 
do before own kind several remember ran meaning 
each good read almost answer triple-0 town instead 
how right look page see front owe held 
out used also earth top American hot already 
then many another far three inside hold taken 
many any never high point making list finally 
so same left mother play early hundred   
would come along parts five learned ten   
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APPENDIX E – SCREENSHOTS OF THE STIMULUS-DELIVERY PROGRAM 
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APPENDIX F – EXCERPT USED IN THE WORD-CHECKING TASK (STUDY 1) 
(see following page) 
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